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Foreword
As the agency with lead responsibility for the funding and monitoring of the RAPID Programme, Pobal welcomes
this report, and the opportunity it offers to scrutinise the processes which can support the integration of
evidence-informed practice into mainstream structures.
Community development is at the heart of much of the work supported by Pobal, and the insights identified
in this report, and indeed other reports from CDI and the wider Area-Based Chilldhood (ABC) Programme
are invaluable to us in better understanding how to effectively engage local residents, establish trust across
agencies and sectors, and minimise the factors which can so readily interrupt or delay progress if they are not
planned for.
In addition, this report clearly indicates the level of skill required to implement a community-based response
to local need: the role of a manual and logic model approach; staff supervision; regular communication and
review; are all referenced as being important determinants in developing innovative and effective responses.
Whilst the focus of the work described in this report relates to a Community Safety Initiative, the learning and
processes are in fact generic and cross-cutting, and are all the more welcome and useful for that.
Denis Leamy,
CEO,
Pobal.
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CDI Response
The Board of CDI is pleased to accept this report, which considers the crucial issues relating to the integration of
learning and approaches from the community sector into statutory services. The insights gained, and experience
described here are important across the breadth of CDIs work, not just in relation to community safety, as so
much relates to integration of learning into mainstream structures. Indeed we believe these insights translate
beyond Tallaght West, as the focus of the work of the Area Based Childhood Programme (ABC) increasingly
seeks to maximise the potential for mainstreaming.
Whilst the report identifies a number of areas for further consideration, it also contains contradictions: it is
suggested that the process took too long, and yet was a replication of work already being done; there was
too strong a focus on outcomes whilst the precursor to this phase was limited by its emphasis on community
engagement events that were felt to have little bearing on the initiatives’ logic model or objectives; the work
is described as innovative and new, and yet at other times it is ‘more of the same’. It is perhaps inevitable that
different stakeholders will bring different voices and perspectives to reflections, and indeed the culmination
of these many voices often brings a richness and depth to our understanding. However, the value of an
independent evaluation has been somewhat limited by the challenge of drawing clear conclusions in the face
of such apparent contradictions. This is possibly exacerbated by the fact that much of this report is based on
the approach underpinning the evaluation of the first phase of this work, the Community Safety Initiative,
conducted by Kearns et al, 2013.
The fundamental question as to whether the Community Safety Initiative brought new thinking, practice and
approaches, goes unanswered in this report. Whilst there are of course generic community development
principles and processes which underpin a great deal of the model, we suggest that the systematic audit of
needs, emphasis on communication and structures to support engagement and identification of needs, and the
requirement to regularly review progress and assess next steps offers a different emphasis: the ‘zoom in’ which
is referred to in the body of the report. It is both inevitable and desirable that we learn from others and take
the best of what is already available and producing improved outcomes. Given that this evaluation was focused
on a very specific phase and aspect of the CSI model, it is inevitable that the report is not fully cognisant of the
range of literature and research in this field.
The report offers areas for further consideration, including the role of the various stakeholders in progressing
and supporting community safety; effective mechanisms for engaging local residents in structures over lengthy
periods of time; and maintaining positive and effective communication across multiple organisations within
the context of competing demands and priorities. These issues are not unique to Tallaght West or indeed to
community safety initiatives, but rather are core challenges when seeking to work collaboratively.
The Manual which was developed as part of the process described in this report continues to offer a framework
and guide for those involved in improving involvement in and outcomes for community safety, and we hope
that the suite of reflections now available will inform and support other areas, and organisations in their best
efforts.
'U6X]DQQH*XHULQ,
Chair, CDI Board of Management.
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The report would not have been possible without the efforts of those who contributed to the research. The
researcher wishes to sincerely thank the stakeholder agencies (Tallaght Youth Service, Circle Housing, Killinarden
Community Centre, Fettercairn Community Estate Management, Fettercairn Community Centre and individual
members of An Garda Siochana). The researcher is grateful to the many local people who contributed to the
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the Board and CEO of the Childhood Development Initiative and the staff team, past and present. A word of
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&RQFHSWVDQG7HUPV8VHGLQWKH5HSRUW
$QWL6RFLDO%HKDYLRXU

In legislation this usually refers to continuous nuisance behaviour that can cause
harm to citizens. A wider definition is usually given to this term by social scientists
and constitutes everything implied by its opposite – pro-social behaviour. This
wider concept can include any excessive behaviour that can cause harm by
whosoever causes it, e.g. fraud, pollution, breaches of human rights.

&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\

Local informal crime control involving state, civic and community organisations
working collaboratively to produce safer and more secure living environments
and to improve quality of life.

0DQXDOLVHG$SSURDFK

Involves the adherence to a set of policies and practices in a service document or
manual. The manual sets out the targets, actions and outcomes to be achieved.
Following a manual enables a programme or project to be replicated elsewhere
and for it to be evaluated using the same criteria.

6LWXDWLRQDO&ULPH
Prevention

Preventive measures that reduce the supply of opportunities to commit crime.
Examples are alarms, locks, CCTV and physical adjustments to buildings.

6RFLDO&ULPH3UHYHQWLRQ

Preventive measures that reinforce pro-social behaviour. Examples are youth
work, early childhood interventions and Garda Youth Diversion Projects.
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$6%

Anti-Social Behaviour

CET

Community Engagement Team

CDI

Childhood Development Initiative

CEO

Chief Executive Officer

&6(5

Centre for Social and Educational Research

&6,

Community Safety Initiative

&6,0

Community Safety Initiative Manual

DIT

Dublin Institute of Technology

*<'3 Garda Youth Diversion Project
JLO

Juvenile Liaison Officer

JPC

Joint Policing Committee

LPF

Local Policing Forum

028

Memorandum of Understanding

18,*

National University of Ireland, Galway

RAPID Revitalising Areas by Planning, Investment and Development
RCs

RAPID Co-ordinators

RP

Restorative Practice

6'&&

South Dublin County Council
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([HFXWLYH6XPPDU\
3XUSRVHDQG6FRSH
The Revitalising Areas by Planning, Investment and Development Programme (RAPID) was a local development
initiative to counter disadvantage in local communities and was co-ordinated by local authorities. In 2011,
the Childhood Development Initiative (CDI) entered a partnership with South Dublin County Council (SDCC) to
assign some of the RAPID staff to implement the Community Safety Initiative (the Initiative). The assignment of
RAPID Co-ordinators (RCs) added a key strategic dimension to the work of CDI.
The Community Safety Initiative has had two phases: from 2009 to 2011 which was evaluated by a research
team from the National University of Ireland, Galway (Kearns, et al, 2013); and the second involved the
assignment of the RCs to implement the Initiative in two pilot sites in Tallaght West from May 2011 to June
2012. The current report is concerned with the second of these two phases. The key goal of CDI in this phase
was to mainstream the Initiative with a statutory partner. In this context the Initiative was founded upon a
memorandum of understanding between CDI and the South Dublin County Council (SDCC).
The evaluation is primarily concerned with this mainstreaming process and to identify the lessons learned
in policy and practice terms. Dr Matt Bowden, Lecturer in Sociology at Dublin Institute of Technology and
researcher at the Centre for Social and Educational Research was commissioned to conduct the evaluation.
The evaluation was commissioned by CDI with the following brief:
ō “To assess the impact of the assignment of RAPID coordinators to delivering the CSI on: o Their approach;
o The approach of the CDI team;
o The CSI model;
o The interagency relationships;
o The perceptions of community safety among residents of the pilot sites where the RAPID
Coordinators worked; and
o The relationships between residents and those delivering services in the CSI pilot sites where the
RAPID Coordinators worked.
ō To name the challenges in this approach and responses to these; and
ō To identify recommendations for next steps, both within Tallaght West and for impacting more widely
on policy and practice” (Evaluation Brief).

(YDOXDWLRQ5HVHDUFK0HWKRGV
A mixed methods research tool-kit was used to evaluate the Initiative. This involved:
ō Semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders in state agencies, service providers and community
groups (n=15 participants);
ō A survey of residents (n=86) in the two pilot sites; and,
ō A series of three focus groups with stakeholders, residents and young people (n=12 participants).

xii

.H\)LQGLQJVDQG,VVXHV
The evaluation documented the following key developments:
ō The Initiative took a major strategic shift towards mainstreaming in this phase by successfully assigning
the RAPID staff and integrating them within a cross agency task team involving CDI staff.
ō The Initiative was supported by inter agency relationships at three levels involving the CDI based
Community Safety Steering Committee; the local committees in pilot sites and a cross agency task
team, the Community Engagement Team.
ō The Initiative finalised the Community Safety Initiative Manual in this phase.
ō Two pilot sites were identified and the RCs mobilised activity programmes involving key stakeholder
agencies and local residents.

7KHHYDOXDWLRQLGHQWLğHGWKHIROORZLQJDUHDVRILPSDFW
ō The Initiative enabled the RCs to work in particular neighbourhoods to focus on particular problems
and issues.
ō Through the assignment of the RCs as staff of the SDCC, the Initiative has been a learning experience
for the Council which has embraced the model in achieving its objectives.
ō The CDI staff developed a Community Safety Initiative Manual which is now ready for wider
implementation.
ō The Initiative managed to reignite an interest in community safety amongst the various stakeholders.
The key agencies became partners in the Initiative and agencies such as An Garda Síochána, the Youth
Service and the local authority along with key local resources, played some part at co-ordination and /
or implementation level.
ō The results of the survey showed that perceptions of safety among households in the Fettercairn site
were greater than they were for the Killinarden site.
ō There was more specific emphasis on producing tangible community safety ‘quick wins’ in the
Fettercairn site and this, according to agencies there, was a critical factor in shaping the perceptions
of improved safety. This contrasts with the Killinarden site where the emphasis was on environmental
improvements that appeared not to have an impact upon perceptions of safety among residents.
ō The RCs used their existing contacts to make further inroads into communities that had felt
abandoned. The African community at Fettercairn through their community leaders and in their survey
responses reported that they had a better connection to community services.

7KHHYDOXDWLRQLGHQWLğHGWKHIROORZLQJNH\OHVVRQVIRUSROLF\DQGSUDFWLFH
ō The RCs combined their community networks and relationships of goodwill to deliver the Initiative
especially in the achievement of quick wins. The latter produced perceived safety effects especially at
the Fettercairn site.
ō The RCs as SDCC staff were vertically integrated within the local authority structure and so managed
to create flows of communication between the Council and the community. This has the potential to
place community safety at the heart of local government.
ō Greater development time is needed to develop the model and especially to build the capacity of the
local community to sustain community safety.

xiii

ō Situational crime prevention measures, in the form of small changes to the security of local authority
properties, physical improvements to individual premises and problem-solving on nuisance issues, have
shown to impact positively upon the quality of life of residents. Furthermore, it demonstrates to local
residents that local government cares about them and is responsive.
ō Community safety cannot focus upon situational crime prevention measures alone for these run the
risk of creating displacement. Agencies need to work together to ensure that one aspect of
community safety does not potentially create further problems by, for example, redistributing risks
from one group of people to another.

5HFRPPHQGDWLRQVDQG1H[W6WHSV
ō The mainstreaming process should be extended across South County Dublin to other areas in Tallaght
West, to be identified using the Community Safety Initiative Manual. Replication of the Initiative
should be steered by a lead agency acting as the co-ordinating body with the support of a range of
agencies and the local communities at the implementation level.
ō A key lesson from this report is that the local authority, by virtue of its co-ordinating capacity for
local services and its pivotal position within the Joint Policing Committee structure, is the key agency
for community safety.
ō CDI has a specialist role in supporting agencies in replicating the community safety model in other
settings. It has a role to play in setting forward guidelines for implementation, training and advising
the lead agency.
ō A minimum of three years is required in any further piloting to develop sustainable safety outcomes
with a post-implementation phase of at least two years to maintain community capacity and monitor
community safety issues as they arise.
ō It is recommended that for future deployments of personnel to community work, the practitioner is a
highly skilled professional who has community development skills to facilitate community participation,
together with an understanding of crime prevention, human security and social cohesion.
ō The lead agency will be the body responsible for commissioning an evaluation of any community
safety replication in consultation with the support agency. This evaluation will be a key means through
which mainstreaming can be further developed and ultimately towards replication on a wider scale.

xiv

&KDSWHUɔ,QWURGXFWLRQ

2YHUYLHZDQG&RQWH[W
Community safety is a new concept in Ireland but has been widely practiced as a form of local crime prevention
and low-level crime control in the UK since the early 1990s. In England and Wales, Community Safety
Partnerships became a key mechanism for the delivery of crime and security policy after the Criminal Justice Act
1998 (Gilling 2005; Gilling et al, 2013). Critics have argued that these partnerships represented the extension
of a form of government at a distance as the state withdrew from the provision of welfare, educational and
preventative services that had characterised government since 1945 (Rose, 1999). Advocates argue that the
practice of community safety enabled a wider range of actors to activate around questions of crime and antisocial behaviour in stressed communities (see Hughes 2007). The CDI as a promoter of community safety in the
Irish context has pioneered an approach to local community safety practice and piloted a variety of approaches
with mixed results (Kearns et al, 2013), while learning a great deal in the process. Community safety is also
to be found in a number of other domains. Examples of these include the urban regeneration programme in
Limerick and a variety of Local Drugs Task Force Areas (see for example, Finglas Safety Forum) (Bowden and
Topping, 2015).
There is an emerging policy context for community safety approaches in Ireland but this framework remains
nascent and underdeveloped to date. Most particularly the Garda Act 2005 enabled the establishment of Joint
Policing Committees (JPCs) in each local authority area (Bowden and Topping, 2015). The Committees enable
police, local authority members and community / voluntary representatives to identify safety and security related
issues. In addition, the Act allows for the setting up of Local Policing Fora (LPF) whereby the police and a variety
of stakeholders can identify and resolve local policing, security and safety challenges. The Community Safety
Initiative has been piloted against this backdrop and as such the work pioneered in Tallaght West contains
significant lessons for policy development and ongoing practice within this newly emerging field.
The Community Safety Initiative was developed by CDI by bringing together residents, police, local authority
and key stakeholders with the aim of reducing anti-social behaviour and crime in local neighbourhoods. The
Initiative arose from initial research that had identified safety as an issue impacting on the wellbeing of children
and families in Tallaght West. An initial phase of the Initiative was implemented from 2008 to 2011.
The Revitalising Areas by Planning, Investment and Development Programme (RAPID) was a local development
programme to counter disadvantage in local communities and was co-ordinated by local authorities. The RAPID
Programme wound down in 2010 and is no longer funded by the Government. A key focus for RAPID was
working in partnership in local communities on issues including community safety and anti-social behaviour
(Pobal, 2014).
The Childhood Development Initiative (CDI) entered a partnership with South Dublin County Council to assign
some of the RAPID staff to implement the Community Safety Initiative. The assignment of RAPID Co-ordinators
(RCs) added a key strategic dimension to the work of CDI and set up an experiment in the governance of urban
security in Ireland. The Initiative has managed to bring a focus to community safety within the context of local
government. In this regard, those involved in the Initiative are keen that the lessons learned are outlined and
discussed through an objective, independent evaluation. In this context the CDI and its stakeholders are in a key
position to influence the scope and depth of community safety practice. This report outlines the key research
findings for this evaluation together with critical issues for policy and practice developments.



6FRSHRIWKH(YDOXDWLRQ5HSRUWDQG7HUPVRI5HIHUHQFH
The Child Development Initiative (CDI) commissioned Dr Matt Bowden, Centre for Social and Educational
Research (CSER) and School of Social Sciences and Law, Dublin Institute of Technology (DIT) to evaluate the
Community Safety Initiative following the assignment of RAPID Co-ordinators in the period May 2011 to June
2012. The Initiative was delivered in two pilot sites in the Tallaght West area during this time. Dr Bowden was
commissioned with the following brief:
ō “To assess the impact of the assignment of RAPID coordinators to delivering the CSI on: o Their approach;
o The approach of the CDI team;
o The CSI model;
o The interagency relationships;
o The perceptions of community safety among residents of the pilot sites where the RAPID
Coordinators worked; and
o The relationships between residents and those delivering services in the CSI pilot sites where the
RAPID Coordinators worked.
ō To name the challenges in this approach and responses to these; and
ō To identify recommendations for next steps, both within Tallaght West and for impacting more widely
on policy and practice” (Evaluation Brief).

0HWKRGRORJ\DQG(YDOXDWLRQ)UDPHZRUN
The request to tender indicated that the evaluation focus upon approaches, relationships and perceptions,
together with identifying themes for wider policy and practice. The researcher mobilsed a mixed methods
tool kit within the realistic evaluation framework (Pawson and Tilley, 1998) which examined context (the
conditions in the setting that require the introduction of measures / actions); mechanisms (the reasoning and
resources mobilised to cause effects in the context) and outcomes (the actual practical effects generated by
the mechanisms). The evaluation therefore examined the appropriateness of actions and measures applied
as interventions to alter or change the context. As a result of the implementation of a set of measures, the
evaluation aimed to identify key outcomes; and progress towards the achieving of outcomes in the short
implementation period.
The mixed methods tool kit involved three main elements including a series of semi-structured interviews with
key stakeholders; a community survey of perceptions of residents in two pilot sites and a series of three focus
groups in the two sites (see Table 1.1 below). To set out the context, the researcher also reviewed relevant
internal documents including steering committee minutes, CDI documents and reflection notes / case studies
prepared by the RAPID Co-ordinators.
A list of 18 individual stakeholders was supplied to the researcher by CDI of which 15 were interviewed. The
interviews took place between September and November 2013. Interviews drew from a standard interview
guide prepared by the researcher (Appendix 1). Interviews were recorded using digital voice recording and
were transcribed by the researcher. A thematic analysis was used to identify key issues and patterns.

3

The household survey took place in early October 2013 and was administered by a team of fieldworkers recruited
by CDI with training and support from Dr. Matt Bowden and Triona Collins of DIT. An existing questionnaire,
prepared by a previous researcher, was adapted by the research team and appropriate changes were made
in the training process and in a short pilot prior to the fieldwork stage (see Appendix 2). The questionnaire
gathered background profile data from the respondents, their involvement in and awareness of the Initiative,
and their feelings of safety and security in living in their neighbourhoods. A total of 86 households of a possible
174 completed the survey producing a response rate of 49.4 percent.
Four focus groups with respondents in the two sites were organised. Focus groups were held by area and
by sector and involved residents of one of the pilot sites, those involved in estate management and youth
services. A focus group was held with young people involved with the youth intervention in the Fettercairn
area. Respondents were shown photographs of the neighbourhoods and invited to make sense in their own
terms of the slides shown. In two of the focus groups involving adults, some of the survey findings were
presented for discussion. Groups were recorded and transcribed.
7DEOH6XPPDU\RI5HVHDUFK0HWKRGV
Method

7RWDO1XPEHU

Interviews with key stakeholders

15 participants

Household survey

86 households

Focus groups x 3

12 participants

The research was executed within the ethical standards governing research in the Dublin Institute of Technology
and was approved by the Research Ethics Committee. Under the Garda Research Protocol permission was
sought and received from the Garda Analysis Service to interview members of An Garda Síochána.
Recorded interviews, focus groups and notes taken in the field were transcribed. Data were analysed using
a basic starting scheme to produce key nodes or foci within the data. A start list of basic codes was used to
generate additional codes from the data. For this evaluation the researcher used the RAAMPS schema outlined
by Miles and Huberman (1994: 61). This schema is useful for identifying relationships, actions and processes in
the settings involved. The RAAMPS adapted can be summarised as follows:
ō 5HODWLRQVKLSV how relationships were formed or transformed and the modes of engagement by
which actors communicate(d).
ō $FWV specific brief actions carried out as to how actors ordered the setting and how this enabled the
future ordering of the setting.
ō $FWLYLWLHV as the ongoing and durable actions activities generated by key actors.
ō 0HDQLQJV the production of meaning in the setting through actions, documents or verbal
communication between actors.
ō 3DUWLFLSDWLRQ the adaptations to the situation made by actors engaged in the setting.
ō 7KH6HWWLQJ in this context the pilot sites and across Tallaght West where relevant.
The researcher took an inductive approach from the first day of field work. Thus as each interview or ‘speech
event’ took place, the researcher engaged in ongoing frame analysis using the method of strip resolution, which
involves gaining understanding of the connections between the actors, actions and relationships by resolving

4

questions with participants (see Agar, 1996). Using this method the researcher is ‘taught’ by the participants.
Themes were identified in data analysis using Becker’s (1979) guiding principles:
L The selection and definition of problems, concepts and indices – using participants’ accounts of the Initiative
to generate a conceptual map and overview of the actions taken;
LL Establishing the frequency and distribution of phenomena i.e. what is typical and widespread by identifying
the frequency with which an issue or theme is identified from different standpoints.
The quantitative data analysis used frequency and percentage distributions to explore patterns in the results.
Relevant evaluative data from the survey was discussed in focus groups to deepen and enrich the survey data
and the focus groups.

/LPLWDWLRQVRIWKH(YDOXDWLRQ5HVHDUFK
A number of key factors should be acknowledged that constrain the research.
ō One of the focus groups organised for one of the pilot sites did not take place, as those specifically
invited did not attend. Consequently the evaluation cannot fully assess in detail the relationships
between residents and service providers in this site. Apart from the youth focus group, two other
focus groups did not achieve full attendance but both had viable numbers for the groups to proceed.
ō The evaluation research is a retrospective study and commenced almost 15 months after the Initiative
had been implemented. This might have been a factor influencing the nature of responses made by all
stakeholders.
ō Some of the questions in the household survey might have attracted non-response where the
respondent was unable or refused to answer a question. A response category for these cases was not
included in the questionnaire and so there are some missing values in parts of the dataset.
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&KDSWHUɕ%DFNJURXQGWR&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\,QLWLDWLYHWKH
Assignment of RAPID Co-ordinators and the Implementation
of the Initiative in 2011 and 2012

,QWURGXFWLRQ
This Chapter broadly sets out the CDI model, the evolution of the Community Safety Initiative and the approach
of the key partners in their implementation of the Initiative. A series of steps led to the formation of the
Initiative and these are traced in order to locate community safety work in the development of CDI. The critical
milestones in the development of the Initiative are the original research report by the Dartington Social Research
Unit, the CDI Strategy and the Community Safety Consultation Process. The chapter briefly summaries each of
these steps together with key issues identified in the evaluation of the first phase of the Initiative from 20082011. Finally the chapter outlines the developments leading to the assignment of the RAPID Co-ordinators
(RCs) to implement the Community Safety Initiative in 2011 and 2012.

Ł+RZDUHRXUNLGV"DQGWKH1HHGWR,PSURYH6DIHW\
In preparation for the CDI strategy, the Dartington Social Research Unit was commissioned to research areas
of need for children and families in Tallaght West. The research report ‘How are Our Kids’ (Axford et al, 2004)
identified ten ‘need groups’ based upon a survey using a representative sample and a series of case studies: a
number of these need groups were identified as resulting from safety related issues. The research highlighted
that ten percent of children were affected by anti-social behaviour and bullying; and five percent of children, it
was estimated, were at risk of isolation as they retreated to home to protect themselves from such behaviours.
Moreover, the research noted that 88% of children were affected by crime and 71% of families were affected
by antisocial behaviour. This might well, the report argued, contribute to isolation of families and children
based upon fear. Forty seven percent of children in the sample were bullied at school. Families attempting to
deal with crime in their areas reported that they feared intimidation if they reported incidents to the authorities.
One research participant poignantly put it:
“30 of us went down to the Guards once because there were three families causing trouble. You
had to sign your name and we had a petition, but people were afraid to sign their names…”
(cited from Axford et al, 2004: 57).
The report reasoned that these findings could have negative developmental effects on children and add further
stress upon parenting and on the children’s education. The research therefore pointed to the need for a wider
safety focused strategy to improve the developmental ecology in the neighbourhood, the family and in schools.

&',6WUDWHJ\'RFXPHQW
In 2005 CDI published its strategy document after an area-wide consultation during which baseline data were
presented (Carrol, 2005). The strategy set forward a vision, agreed outcomes and a programme of activities to
meet with the need areas identified. These activity areas were presented under six headings: early childhood care
and education for all; integrated services in schools and child/family centres; new targeted services; improving
existing service provision; advocating to reduce major stresses on children and families; and evaluation and
application of the lessons learned from implementation.
The strategy provided the broad brushstrokes for the development of an ecological system that would support
child development through the integration of familial and state systems and ultimately lead over time to wider
economic and social effects. These long term outcomes would include for example less crime, reductions in
poverty rates, and improved physical and mental wellbeing which would in turn impact positively in revenue
and welfare outcomes for the State.
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Within this broad strategy, a key outcome identified was that children would be less likely to be victimised and
that they would report feeling safe in their areas. CDI said that it would advocate for improved safety in the
neighbourhood in conjunction with An Garda Síochána by for example improving Garda presence.

&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\&RQVXOWDWLRQ 
A comprehensive community consultation process was conducted by CDI between 2006 and 2008 in relation
to community safety (Cahill, Murphy and Guerin, n.d). The process developed in six stages from an initial
consultation with 14 community groups and progressed to consultative exercises in schools and a community
wide survey of 669 respondents.
In stage one of the consultation CDI sought to ascertain whether there was support for a Community Safety
Contract. Question 5 of the consultation (p.10) asked ‘could your group support a community contract?’
The report points out that while concerns were expressed participants seemed to show support in favour of
developing it. However under question 6 where respondents were invited to identify obstacles, statements
included: ‘I know lots of bullies who won’t sign and will not like us signing either’; and that there was a ‘fear
of residents to get involved’ (p.11).
Stage 4 reports on a wide consultation in schools and included a photo competition, class exercises and
discussions. Experiences were identified – one young person pointed out “Most children in the estates do
not have an aim in life and do not see the point in staying in school or going to college” (p.25). The findings
were fed back to the community in a series of consultation meetings. The process identified a series of goals
including decrease in drug use; tackle anti social behaviour; increase Garda presence; more activities for young
people; and young people taking pride in their community and themselves. The issues identified were to be
fed to a new Community Safety Committee who would act on the findings of the consultation and community
survey. The findings of the consultation process served as the basis for the implementation of the Initiative in
phase 1 in the original pilot sites between 2009 and 2011.

 (YDOXDWLRQRI&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\,QLWLDWLYHE\1DWLRQDO8QLYHUVLW\RI
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The assignment of the RAPID co-ordinators took place in the latter phase of implementing the Community
Safety Initiative from May 2011. The previous stage of the Initiative’s development was the subject of an
evaluation conducted by the Child and Family Research Centre, NUIG (Kearns et al, 2013).
The report pointed to the energy and ingenuity of the Initiative in mobilising a new way of dealing with antisocial behaviour and safety and utilising local crime prevention resources at community level. The evaluation
research identified that there was ‘low community representation’ and an eventual reduction in service agency
support in 2010. This led to a hiatus in the development of the Initiative and seriously reduced the capacity to
deliver on the objectives and goals. The report also highlighted that the Community Safety Initiative Manual
was not available during implementation.
A critical finding was that there were mechanisms proposed that were externally predetermined and stakeholders
identified that this was a factor in undermining local participation and confidence in the Initiative. Particular
attention in the report focused upon the implementation of a Community Safety Agreement, a particular



technology transferred from Islington in London. However no community safety contracts were implemented
between 2008 and 2011. It was felt that this precluded stakeholder input into designing safety mechanisms to
meet local problems in the target areas. This appeared to conflict with community ownership principles implied
in the Initiative and those of some of the stakeholders.
The report questioned the wisdom of investing substantial time and resources in the organisation of community
wide engagement events that would have a ‘spill over’ effect on participation, and by extension, safety. The
events, the authors noted, did not achieve the purpose for which they were intended. The report pointed
to two critical developments in the later stage that were crucial to the future direction of the Initiative – the
Restorative Practice training programme and the assignment of the RAPID Co-ordinators to implementing the
Initiative. In conclusion the evaluation report pointed out that the Initiative
….has not improved community safety to any significant level in Tallaght West when examined
from the perspective of progress made towards the achievement of the CSI’s anticipated longterm goals. Core research evidence gathered from a diversity of stakeholders…..consistently
reported on significant barriers and challenges concerning low community representation in
implementing the CSI, the lack of an agreed implementation framework and an insufficient level
of tangible progress over the course of the three years – all of which weakened the capacity
of the Initiative to achieve its long term safety goals during the implementation period (20082011) and challenges in building cooperative relationships between some stakeholders limited
progress towards achieving the CSI goal of encouraging wide collaboration in maintaining a
safe environment in Tallaght West. Thus the capacity of the Initiative to enhance local safety
and development structures and systems was impeded and not realised during the evaluation
period.
(Kearns et al, 2013: 77).
The evaluation recommended that the Initiative needed greater clarity of purpose and that it should devise
implementation pathways to achieve and action goals. The Initiative would need to ensure that there was sufficient
local input and that actions delivered should be tangible in the target areas. The report also recommended
greater management and maintenance of partnership relationships; that community development principles
should be practiced; and that alternative means of involving stakeholders other than in committee structures
needed to be developed.

'HVLJQLQJDQG,PSOHPHQWLQJWKH&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\,QLWLDWLYH
The Initiative moved into a new developmental stage in 2011 and 2012 with the assignment of the RAPID coordinators from South Dublin County Council (SDCC) to work on a part-time basis with CDI to implement the
Initiative. In addition the Community Safety Initiative Manual (CSIM) which had been previously unavailable and
to which the RAPID Co-ordinators had a significant input, was launched in September of 2012. The Initiative
was therefore positioned to utilise the learning from the earlier phase and deploy new sets of community safety
actions in pilot estates. Key elements of the model and the implementation timeline for this phase are outlined
in Figure 2.1 below.
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$FWLRQ
Initial discussions and agreement of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
Induction and formation of Community Engagement Team (CET) with CDI
Community Engagement Co-ordinators and RAPID Co-ordinators
Identification of Pilot Sites
Establishing local Community Safety Committees in Pilot Sites and agreement
of activity plans
Community Safety Audit in two pilot sites
Youth Sub Committee established at the Fettercairn site
Ongoing actions in implementing Initiative
Contribution from CET and RAPID Co-ordinators to Community Safety Manual
Final CET meeting with RAPID Co-ordinators

7LPHOLQH0DUNHU
November 2010 to May 2011
May 2011
End of August 2011
September to October 2011
September 2011
October 2011
October 2011 to June 2012
April to June 2012
September 2012

Given that the Manual was finalised during 2011 and 2012, this evaluation report is concerned with the first set
of actions deployed in the testing of the CSM. The Manual was developed as a way of transferring the Initiative
between communities in Tallaght West and beyond. While the Manual recognises the unique characteristics of
each community, it also stresses the need for ‘fidelity to the manual’ in order that the approach taken can be
consistently evaluated from setting to setting. The Manual intends to harness enthusiasm and motivation of
the community around issues and needs rather than being a total prescription for community safety practice.
That said, the Manual points out that adapting the thrust of the model should not ‘compromise the theory or
purpose underpinning the programme’ (CDI, 2012: 14) once the benefits of change for the participants are
clear.
Central to the implementation of the Initiative is CDI’s desired outcome to help children feel safe and happy
and to belong to their community (CDI, 2012: 8). The goal here is to improve aspects of the developmental
ecology: supports in neighbourhoods that underpin the capacity of families and their communities, improve
the developmental ecology underpinning child development. In turn the Manual points out that it is part of the
wider CDI strategy of “promoting community change Initiatives to improve the physical and social fabrics of the
neighbourhoods in which children live, play and learn” (CDI, 2012: 8).
At the heart of the CSIM is the logic model for the Initiative which sets out the need for the Initiative, the
intended outcomes, the elements of the action plan and the inputs or resources to be mobilised to achieve
the outcomes. A key underlying spirit of the logic model however is community participation, and ultimately
community ownership for community safety as a process.
The logic model outlines three intended outcomes for the Community Safety Initiative:
ō Improved safety and pro-social behaviour across Tallaght West;
ō Improved community awareness of and participation in local activities and services; and
ō Wide community engagement in maintaining a safe environment.



The logic model also points out six aspects of a process model leading ultimately to the implementation of an
action plan:
ō Identifying key leaders and relevant stakeholders;
ō Assessing community readiness and carrying out community consultation;
ō Community engagement, empowerment and participation;
ō Establishing and developing a community safety steering committee;
ō Carrying out a comprehensive audit; and
ō Developing a strategy and action plan based upon the audit.
The Manual points out that requirements include key individuals to act in both catalytic and championing roles –
the former are people who introduce community safety to the community; the champion - a person of influence
among their peers, drives community involvement. An additional requirement for community safety is a lead
agency that might serve as a funding body. The logic model envisages a co-ordinator to facilitate the inputs
of the various participants. This is a professional, and remunerated role, ideally. A community safety steering
group would grow out of a core working group in the initial stages and it would expand the membership as
necessary and might well draw upon external expertise and / or an independent chairperson.
The logic model also points out that the community’s capacity for participation within community safety needs
to be developed with the appropriate knowledge, competencies and skills. Hence the Manual suggests that
in line with good practice, training be undertaken with key leaders, stakeholders and the steering committee.

 $VVLJQPHQWRI5$3,'&RRUGLQDWRUV
From 2008 the Initiative was a core part of the CDI strategy and was unique within CDI in two respects: that it
was being implemented directly by CDI staff rather than through commissioned services; and it was a community
primary preventive programme as distinct from direct child-family focus, in comparison to other programmes
in CDI. Reviewing the process in its third year of implementation, it was proposed to open discussions with the
local authority to become the lead agency to implement the Community Safety Initiative.
A key factor in this move was the understanding of the key role that the SDCC plays in community development
in Tallaght West. The CEO of CDI met with the Director of Housing to advance the discussions on the possibility
of this arrangement and the process of negotiating the details of the arrangements for seconding SDCC staff
on a part time basis took place between November 2010 and April 2011. The discussions leading to the
assignment of the RAPID Co-ordinators were brought forward in an effort to mainstream the Initiative. Internal
CDI planning meetings identified issues to be addressed to advance the assignment forward.
A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was then signed in May 2011. It was agreed that the basis of
SDCC staff involvement with implementing the Initiative would be considered as an ‘assignment’ rather than a
‘secondment’. The MOU (CDI, May 2011: 4-5) set out the aims of the assignment as follows:
ō Test the relevance, applicability and effectiveness of the CSI Manual in achieving the stated aims of
the CSI;
ō Support the existing work in pilot sites identified in Brookfield and Jobstown;
ō Identify two further pilot sites of approximately 100 households in Fettercairn and Killinarden;



ō Develop community capacity to engage effectively with the CSI leading to the establishment of
community safety agreements and implementation structures/protocols in each of the pilot sites;
ō Enhance the engagement and outcomes in the existing pilot sites in Jobstown and Brookfield; and
ō Incorporate the work undertaken in McUillium into structures, processes and activities, as relevant.
The MOU pointed out that the SDCC staff would be part of the Community Engagement Co-ordinators team
in CDI for an agreed ten-month period between May 2011 and March 2012 (later extended until end of
June 2012). The SDCC team thus agreed to work on implementing a ‘manualised approach’ to community
safety in which their core tasks would include identifying pilot sites; supporting participation of stakeholders
in restorative practice training; and promoting working relationships between residents and service providers.
The MOU also pointed out initially that the SDCC staff would implement the community safety agreements in
the neighbourhoods identified for this next phase of the Initiative. This was subsequently revised in discussions
with SDCC staff who did not feel this was an appropriate approach.
The SDCC assigned three of its four RAPID co-ordinators on a part-time basis to implement the Initiative.
The RAPID programme had operated in local authority areas designated by Government in 2001 and was
wound down in 2010. The assignment of the co-ordinators was seen as a critical opportunity by CDI given
the extensive range of contacts, goodwill and corporate knowledge already accumulated by the RAPID Coordinators operating in disadvantaged neighbourhoods in Tallaght West. Three staff were each assigned for a
total of 16.5 hours per week. A line management arrangement was set in place whereby both CDI Community
Engagement staff and RAPID co-ordinators would retain their existing reporting relations and that both line
managers in CDI and SDCC would liaise to identify implementation issues and propose solutions as appropriate.
Quarterly reports on progress to management would be prepared by the line managers. The day-to-day
implementation of the Initiative would be with the Community Engagement Team who held monthly meetings
to draw up action plans and to review ongoing progress. The CET acted as the key implementation group for
the Initiative in selecting pilot sites and developing the manual.

 7KH,GHQWLğFDWLRQRIWKH3LORW6LWHVDQGWKHLU&KDUDFWHULVWLFV
Two pilot sites were identified following consultation in the Fettercairn and Killinarden areas respectively. The
consultation was conducted with key community leaders and existing community structures in both sites
including estate management, community centres and service providers operating at community level. These
were drawn primarily from the contacts that the RCs had at this level. A report on initial consultations in
Killinarden and Fettercairn was presented to the Community Engagement Team on 21st June 2011. Progress
was made in identifying newly built housing in both areas as potential sites and which were of the target
size (approx 100 houses) for the Initiative. RAPID Co-ordinators stressed the integral role of both SDCC and
community estate management personnel in the identification of sites and their subsequent participation as
key actors in the Initiative.
In Killinarden a section of new housing which fronted onto an established Council estate was identified. The
CET noted that this section was particularly needy and was managed by Circle Housing Association. Litter,
planning and environmental issues were identified as key actions that might be a starting point for intervention.
At Fettercairn a section of newly built in-fill housing initially identified as the pilot site. The consultation meeting
heard that there were a lot of young families, and that there was potential to form an inter agency and
community based committee. The meeting also heard that racism was a particular issue in this site.



Pilot sites were affirmed by the CET at the meeting of 20th September 2011. The setting up local steering
committees in the pilot sites to implement the Initiative was achieved by October 2011.
The pilot sites are both described as ‘interface’ areas. As both sites are in-fill developments, they are constructed
within or on the boundaries of, existing council housing. This means that they have distinct demographic
characteristics. For example in the Killinarden site 104 houses facing a mature housing estate were chosen
where most of the households have very young children, compared with the host neighbourhood which was
built in the early 1980s and has substantially matured. In Fettercairn, the chosen site is more ethnically and
racially heterogeneous than the host neighbourhood. In both sites, housing was allocated from the SDCC
housing lists – residents of these new sites are drawn from a wide geographical area and have different
mobility patterns to those of the host communities. These distinctions were reported to be particularly marked
in the Fettercairn site which has a higher concentration of households who are of African origin. Hence the
‘interface’ areas constitute the boundary lines between largely homogenous working class communities whose
residents originated from population dispersal from the inner city and working class estates in the outer city
built between the 1930s and 1950s (e.g. Crumlin, Drimnagh, Ballyfermot), and a new diverse group in need of
social housing that includes migrants from Europe and Africa. The issue of safety in these two sites was therefore
highly challenging because they were complicated by issues of race, multiculturalism, and consequently, social
cohesion.
The Community Safety Audit was not carried out as per the model contained in the Manual. The RCs reported
to the CET meeting in September 2011 that much of the information recommended under the Local Crime
Prevention Toolkit (see CDI, 2012: 113) was not available. The team acknowledged that crime statistics might
not relate to feelings of safety, for example the January 2012 CET meeting received a report that the Gardai
had identified non-reporting of crimes as an ongoing issue and thus official rates for the area appeared to
be in decline. Some of the softer information like the nature of anti-social behaviour would be known to key
stakeholders and local residents. The team agreed to move ahead with a simpler framework that would gather
qualitative data under the following headings:
ō How safe do you feel in your home?
ō How safe do you feel in your community?
ō Please tell us about issues that impact on your feelings of safety.
ō Are you involved in your community in any way?
ō Is there anything you would be interested in doing as part of a group?
ō Any other comments.
Progress and developments in the Initiative were monitored at the monthly meetings of the CET. Day to day
actions were delivered by the RAPID co-ordinators. A modest budget of €5,000 for actions in each site was
utilised to fund a programme that included:
ō Community events including Christmas parties.
ō Coffee mornings for all residents in both sites.
ō Coffee mornings especially for African residents, Fettercairn.
ō Planting / hanging basket workshops in the Killinarden site.
ō Funding of programmes and equipment for Tallaght Youth Service at Fettercairn.



ō Safety and security works in individual dwellings and situational prevention measures to reduce
congregation and littering including gates to close off alcoves and chains / locks for wheelie bins;
CCTV cameras on individual dwellings and fencing on specific sites.
ō Erection of road safety signs in the Killinarden site.
ō Landscaping works on the boundary between the Killinarden site and the existing housing estate.
The RAPID Co-ordinators developed a tailored approach to dealing with specific young people known locally
to be involved in low-level nuisance behaviour in Fettercairn. A case study was written by the RAPID team
and included in the final version of the CSIM. This involved setting up a sub-group with the specific remit of
responding to the young people’s behaviour. The subcommittee was comprised of the local community Garda;
local authority personnel responsible for anti-social behaviour (ASB); youth workers involved in the Garda Youth
Diversion Projects and local estate management workers. The approach of the subgroup was to develop a
template approach that mapped the characteristics of each individual and their involvement with local services.
Local people were not involved in the naming of the young people and while residents were members of local
steering committees, they did not take part in the youth sub-committee.
In the report by RCs on this particular intervention it is noted:
From a hard supports point of view, the community members on the main group need to remain
largely anonymous and need to be protected for fear of reprisals. At no stage are individual
names of young people aired at the main group meetings. At no stage are the community
members asked to attach names to particular anti-social activities. They are free to do so
however should they wish, with the appropriate agencies.
(Case Study prepared by RAPID Co-ordinators given to the researcher)
Key elements in implementing the Initiative at Fettercairn were the bespoke security and safety measures taken
on the estate and with individual dwellings. These were designed to have an immediate impact on the quality
of life of individual residents at their dwellings, or in the environs of their houses in terms of safety. An example
of the latter is the erection of a line of fencing to redirect pedestrian traffic crossing the GAA pitch away from
houses on this route. A small number of houses had higher fencing erected to stop their boundary walls being
used to enter other premises e.g. the school grounds.

 7KH,QWHU$JHQF\5HODWLRQVKLSV
The Initiative brought together stakeholders on three key levels:
ō Agency representatives from key statutory and service provider agencies across Tallaght;
ō Agency and community representatives at implementation level in the pilot sites and
ō CDI and SDCC RAPID Co-ordinators as a cross agency staff team (see 2.7 above).
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The Community Safety Initiative Steering Committee of CDI was comprised of senior personnel from a variety
of agencies as well as community representatives. This included An Garda Síochána which facilitated wider
actions on community safety such as the identification of sites and agreeing actions on foot of evidence from
the community safety survey.



Agencies represented on the Steering Committee in 2011 and 2012 were:
ō CDI (CEO, Community Engagement Co-ordinators, CET facilitator).
ō An Garda Síochána.
ō SDCC (RCs, Director of Housing, Estate Management).
ō Tallaght Youth Service.
ō Probation Service.
ō Community Representatives from pilot sites at Fettercairn, MacUilliam, Brookview, the Killinarden site,
Jobstown.
The Committee acted as an important exchange of ideas and received updates on implementation issues from
members of the CET. The meeting also discussed policy issues such as the place of CS in the JPCs and strategy
in relation to the engagement of the Initiative with these structures. The Committee also heard reports and
discussed mirco level issues in relation to the implementation of the Initiative in the pilot sites. For example
the issue of a potential displacement was brought to the Committee’s attention - that young people started to
climb over back walls when the CCTV camera was installed at Fettercairn:
Some groups of young people have adjusted their behaviour because of the camera and
are now causing problems around the back of the houses (getting over walls and trying to
break into houses) and others are congregating on and running up and down the stairs of the
apartments.
(Steering Committee Minutes, 2nd November 2011)
Attendance and participation at meetings was high in 2011 (Table 2.1). The number of meetings in 2012 began
to wane and the numbers attending the meetings also began to fall off. This drop in attendance coincides with
the fact that during 2012 CDI began to discuss an ‘exit strategy’ as the Initiative had reached the end of its
agreed implementation period (see various minutes, 2012).
7DEOH&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\6WHHULQJ*URXS0HHWLQJVWR



Meeting Date
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Minutes

3.2.11

8

8.3.11

6

23.5.11

3

23.6.11

9

3.8.11

4

4.10.11

9

2.11.11 

8

2.4.12

5

10.5.12

7

25.9.12

5

New members from the pilot sites join for the first time. Apologies received from member of local steering committee in second
pilot site.



During the course of the Assignment, local residents from Fettercairn attended one meeting and there
were no attendances made from the Killinarden site. This might reflect the capacity that exists within these
neighbourhoods to engage in inter-agency committees at this level. The short time period may have placed
strictures on the Initiative to develop the capacity of local residents for such participation. However, a community
representative, resident of Fettercairn and member of the CDI Board attended meetings more regularly and
added an effective community voice to the meetings.

 5HODWLRQVKLSVDQG&ROODERUDWLRQLQWKH3LORW6LWHV
The RAPID Co-ordinators brought together an interagency steering committee in the two sites and included
members of the local community. These meetings became, for the time they met, a forum for reviewing
activities, for identifying safety issues (for example, road safety, anti-social behaviour and youth interventions
as relevant) and for either direct action by RCs or one of the other agencies present. Committees at this level
included:
ō Circle Housing Association;
ō Killinarden Community Centre;
ō SDCC Estate Management staff;
ō Community Gardai; and,
ō Tallaght Youth Service staff in both sites including the Garda Youth Diversion Project in Fettercairn.

 &RQFOXVLRQ
The Initiative advanced to the second phase of its development. This second phase might be characterised
as the early stages of mainstreaming the Initiative. Primarily this stage was one of moving on from the earlier
phase of the Initiative and to developing a new strategic direction. Critical shifts taken at this time involved the
assignment of the RAPID staff which involved a more intense working relationship with South Dublin County
Council and the publication and launch of the Community Safety Initiative Manual.
This chapter has presented a descriptive outline of the concrete steps taken in the preparation and implementation
of the Initiative. The Community Safety Initiative must be located within the overall CDI strategy and the
development of a more specific logic model for community safety as outlined in the CSIM. The following
chapter of the report outlines and evaluates the implementation of the Initiative, drawing upon the interviews
and focus groups with stakeholders.
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This Chapter presents an analysis of the key themes emerging from the interviews and focus groups with
stakeholders. The themes reflect the evaluative framework to reveal the participants’ responses to questions on
the contexts in which the Initiative was undertaken, the mechanisms used to intervene, and the outcomes or
changes generated by the intervention. The evaluation focused primarily upon the process of mainstreaming of
the Initiative in this stage of its development. Mainstreaming in this context refers to the integration of piloted
initiatives into existing institutional frameworks. Hence the process underway was about merging the work
initiated by CDI with that of the local authority. This chapter explores some of the issues raised by the various
stakeholders.
The Chapter is structured around these key themes and issues that can be summarised as follows.
ō The Community Safety Manual as a tool for mainstreaming and further replication of the Initiative.
ō The recurring theme of the short implementation time period and the implications for the task team
and stakeholders.
ō The challenges in building local relationships and resources.
ō The confluence of factors accompanying the leading up to the mainstreaming process.
ō The complexities presenting as needs and risks in the two pilot sites and their fit with the mechanisms
deployed.
ō The role of the local authority in community safety.
ō The challenges and successes in identifying precise actions to contribute to community safety
outcomes.
ō The successes and challenges in engaging young people in an inclusive community safety process.

0DLQVWUHDPLQJWKH&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\,QLWLDWLYH
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The CDI team embraced the opportunity of mainstreaming the Initiative with the RAPID co-ordinators as it
afforded an opportunity to influence and shape the effectiveness of local service implementation by SDCC in
the pilot areas. The CDI team were conscious in their approach of the need to enable the SDCC staff assigned
to work autonomously to deliver on the outcomes of the Initiative and approached the mainstreaming process
as a chance to shape and deliver practice:
A frontline worker wouldn’t agree to do anything without checking back four times with
somebody else. I felt sorry for anybody working at that level in the Council because it was just
impossible. They had no autonomy. But also you can’t freely co-operate with other people
unless they have that kind of autonomy.
MB: So…you bought some of their time.
Yeah we did.
MB: And was part of that buy-in that you could determine what they did for a period of time?
Yeah it was yeah. Shape it a little bit.
(Member of CDI Team 1)



A key mechanism in the mainstreaming of the Initiative was the development of the Community Safety Manual.
CDI staff pointed out that it was a ‘tool for mainstreaming’. The Manual outlines the essential elements of a
community safety strategy that can be adapted by local communities to their particular context. The manual
offers a guide towards ensuring that an evidence-based approach is adopted and the process can be evaluated.
A critical element of the manual is that it outlines a participatory framework for the involvement of local
communities in the design and implementation of community safety. The process for selecting sites is outlined
together with the proposed implementation structures involving cross agency task teams. RAPID staff worked
as part of the CDI team to finalise the manual and to contribute aspects of CS practice to its content. The
deployment of the RAPID officers was effectively the early testing phase for the manual.
A critical approach to implementing the Initiative in this mainstreaming process was to include the RCs in
making the manual localised and implementable:
There was a draft and then there was a final one so they had an input into the final one, based
on their experience of working with them. It was a good process. It ended up being a really
interesting process and really good learning from it because well you can talk to residents about
what…It worked. It worked on the sites. The issues in Fettercairn are completely different. The
place is transformed compared to the way it was at the start. It worked at that level. But from
the CDI point of view it seriously worked in terms of the idea of mainstreaming a different way
of working and and influencing the council in particular but also the Guards. But the council
have the lead role around community safety. That’s been our experience.
(Member of CDI Team 1)
A critical factor that must be acknowledged is that there was a very short timeframe for implementing this
phase of the Initiative. The implementation phase lasted for just one year and some stakeholders pointed out
that more time was required to develop the approach and to specify the model of action more precisely before
moving to an action stage. The tensions at play in this mainstreaming process involve the merging of analyses,
models of practice, institutional cultures and traditions, the roles of state and non-state actors and of course
the goodwill and participation of local people. One key stakeholder acknowledged that the SDCC ‘was good
at the practical piece’, that CDI was focused on delivery within short timelines, and that this approach was in
tension with the community development process. Such issues needed more time to progress:
Obviously then CDI it knew its timelines. It knew what it was trying to achieve within that
timeframe so probably part of its orientation would be quite task orientated. So there’s some of
the progammes like CSI would be where the process bit was also quite important. Whereas the
afterschools bit was a manual delivered programme, it involved the schools as well but it was
duh duh duh [one thing after another in sequence] where the other was relationship building,
moving at a pace, not a slow pace. I don’t believe in that. I still think you can achieve results.
But maybe it’s how you bring people with it. So they’re different programmes.
MB: Like different gears nearly?
Yes. Yes and some needed more time. They need more lead in time. They need more
implementation time you know. They just need more time. So its hard to see results and I would
have felt that with the healthy schools as well, it was only getting going and it was over. Not
over-over but in terms of the programme time frame and the evaluation time frame it was like
now we’re ready, now we get it, now we see the potential.
(Member of CDI Team 2)



While the CDI team had brought together an ensemble of elements into the process there was some
frustration that more time was needed to deepen the practice, the model and the approach. The timelines for
delivering results, according to one key team member was too short for ensuring that stakeholders had a clear
conceptualisation of what the Initiative was and how it was distinct from general community development:
MB: What should the time have been prioritised in doing?
I think there should have been more of a preplanning phase. Sorry I think there was consultation
but a preplanning figuring out what are we doing, why and bringing the key stakeholders
clearly together with it in terms of the focus and how that was going to be implemented in
terms of a plan and then how it was going to be supported and reviewed. So there was a bit
of a disconnect around it when I got involved. A bit like everything was all over the place and
nothing was really clear about “what’s this all about” “where do all the pieces fit” “why are we
doing this bit and this bit”.
MB: The impact of the change could have been deeper if there had been time to be clear?
Yes it might have. It’s no easy work. The whole community piece is difficult. It’s not an easy
one. But I do think that within CDI that there wasn’t necessarily that community development
understanding or expertise there from the outset.
(Member of CDI Team 2)
While the Initiative got off to a relatively quick start in bringing the two agencies together, there was a strong
view that there was little time for agreeing the scope and depth of the Initiative in relation to the qualitative
aspects of the process outlined in the Manual. The impact of this might have been to place less emphasis on
the process especially in relation to community capacity building.

$SSURDFKRIWKH5$3,'&RRUGLQDWRUV
RCs acknowledged that in the beginning they were sceptical of the Initiative as they had understood that the
earlier phase had experienced difficulties in negotiating a Community Safety Contract. The latter had proven
to be unsuccessful as an approach (Kearns, et al 2013). With this in mind RCs were determined that what they
were offering was not new but the same work they had practiced over many years:
Yeah. We had no interest flogging that dead horse. It just was a bad idea. …So we went in
knowing that we were just going to do things our own way. CDI want to make things look like
it’s new it’s a new initiative you know. Brand new idea. Never done before……It’s just the same
old community development that happens here all the time you know. There’s nothing new
about it. But what was new was maybe was the dedicated time and a concentrated you know
small space.
(SDCC staff 3)
Three key reasons appear to be given by RCs for moving from this initial scepticism. First the development of a
common approach between RAPID and CDI through the CET which gave SDCC staff the opportunity to shape
the scope of the Initiative. Second was the semi-autonomous role given to the RCs in helping to select the sites:
We went and talked to the local structures such as community estate management comprised
of local people. Said to them look this is what we are about where do you think we need to put
our efforts. And they were very clear on where they wanted us to put the efforts in Fettercairn



and the environment. So we went fine and we started working with them on that and then we
went to Killinarden Community Council and where they might benefit and they pointed out their
reasons why where they thought. So it wasn’t our call and we went “fine, we’ll have a look and
see what we can do”.
MB: So they were best able to call the needs?
Yes of course.
MB: And you were then able to find some solutions with them to that?
Yes exactly. And we had worked with both of them through the RAPID Programme through the
years so there was a history of collaboration and bone fides and we did some good work in
partnership I suppose.
(SDCC Staff 1)
The third reason for moving towards a constructive engagement with the Initiative was the opportunity to
influence the formulation of the Manual by making contributions to its content.
The manual was regarded by SDCC staff as being a start-to-finish guide and that many of the steps advised were
easily circumvented because the RCs felt that they were already several steps into the process. For example, the
RAPID staff all individually pointed out the range of contacts they had built up, their relationships with existing
community structures and already being at a more advanced stage. However it was acknowledged that for
entering and working with communities in new sites the manual was an important toolkit.
If you go into an estate which doesn’t have a history of community work or community
development and is a new estate and people are looking for a guide, an implementation guide
to go about something, then it definitely has a value. There’s an awful lot of preparation and
structures and groupings etc and pre work to be done all of which from a resource point of view
has to be looked at.
……it gives you four pages on how to do that, because we’d know the community stakeholders
and we’d been invited by the local groups to come and address their areas, then that fell
out very quickly for us. It wasn’t something that you needed to go around and find out who
these people might be. It was evident. We knew them. So we could short cut everything that
was in the manual. But the manual works as well as an A to Z for anybody who needs to do
something.
(SDCC staff 1)
While this made sense in mobilising the Initiative quickly, and as identified by other stakeholders, the question
of community capacity building for community safety was circumvented. This might have been a missed
opportunity. While new relationships were built at a local level, the relationships might not have been of
sufficient depth or longevity to build capacity for participation and thus sustain the interventions over a longer
term.



The impact of the implementation has been to give SDCC a determination to work collaboratively and more
focus upon engaging with issues:
You can take it this is how we are going to work. We have done it since in [estate], we had
problems up there. There was a couple of families with problems and there was nothing being
done. We moved some people up to talk to them and we set up an environmental group, a
community safety group and the events group and it solved the problem.
(Senior SDCC staff 1)
The Initiative has helped SDCC senior staff to think about their role and the person specification for a community
safety professional who delivers by joining up problems through intra and inter agency linkages while being
someone who is trusted locally:
Yes you need a person who works – the right type of person who can use supports of other
departments to get things done and not a punitive person giving out fines – someone who
people will be glad to see coming along. Someone has to gather up all the problems in an area
– list them and throw it in and then you have a piece of paper that’s going to hop from one
desk to another – there’s got to be a connect.
(Senior SDCC staff 1)
A senior SDCC staff member pointed out that this type of work requires highly trained and communicative staff
who can join up different pieces of local government with good community development practice to create the
right mix of solutions to the problems at hand.

*HQHUDO,PSDFWRI0DLQVWUHDPLQJ
The assignment of the RAPID staff resulted from a confluence of factors and not least the opportunities that
were presented to both parties in 2010. The Government was no longer supporting RAPID and the South
Dublin County Council had over the course of the Programme built up considerable human and social capital
in the communities of Tallaght West. A key organisational context for assigning the RAPID Co-ordinators to
Community Safety was the CDI strategy to mainstream its programmes. A staff member at CDI said it was ‘a
light bulb moment’ during the review with the staff and the CDI Board in 2009: ‘our staff were driving it and
all other programmes were contracted to service agencies so the local authority was the obvious choice’. The
Initiative was the only directly delivered aspect of the CDI strategy and it made organisational and strategic
sense to reach out to the local authority to deliver it.
Equally vital here was that community safety had already been an aspect of the work of the RAPID strategy in
SDCC (Fitzpatrick and Associates, 2007). The SDCC has since become a major arm of the operationalisation
of the Joint Policing Committees (JPCs) established under the Garda Act 2005. Hence it has become an active
agent in Local Policing Fora in its area including Tallaght and Clondalkin. Part of this roll-out also involved the
operation of local clinics that mobilised both Council officials and community Gardai to local problem-solving
in the communities of South Dublin.
The CDI strategy for mainstreaming the Initiative with the local authority has been relatively successful according
to the various stakeholders. For example the assignment of RAPID staff was described by one key stakeholder
as providing ‘an immediate zoom in to the issues and difficulties on particular estates’. This cut through some
of the earlier issues that beset the Initiative in its earlier phase in that it could very quickly identify key safety
issues and work with local stakeholders to get ‘quick wins’.



Both CDI and SDCC stakeholders acknowledge that the overall experience of their collaboration in the
mainstreaming process was a mutually enriching one for both. This is despite the acknowledgement of a
number of tensions and complicating factors:
ō CDI acknowledged as part of this evaluation that there is a tension between delivering needs based
community development approaches, and the manualised curriculum based model. A key issue here
concerns the need to move apace with developing local capacity and the need to develop community
participation, engagement and leadership in bringing forward sustainable community safety practice.
ō CDI viewed RAPID involvement in implementing and testing the Manual as freeing up local authority
staff to act in a more holistic and integrative manner in collaboration with a wide variety of actors,
whilst SDCC staff pointed out as part of the evaluation that such an approach had been developed
by their team over the course of the RAPID Programme anyway and that the approach taken was
continuation of existing practice.
ō At a wider level the SDCC is involved with An Garda Síochána in implementing community safety
through the JPC model which operates outside the manualised framework developed by CDI.
On the whole however, all stakeholders acknowledged that the main parties (CDI and RAPID staff) found each
other to be open to working together and were facilitated by the joint line managers to identify and resolve
issues as they arose. Both parties therefore acknowledged that they found the experience, on balance to be a
valuable one.

 1HHGVDQG5LVNVLQWKH3LORW6LWHVŋ7DFNOLQJ&RPSOH[,VVXHVDWWKHŁ,QWHUIDFHł
The evaluation researcher asked stakeholders to describe in their own words the nature of the issues presenting
in the pilot sites. These are summarised in Figure 3.1 below. Recurring themes in the pilot sites give a clear
insight into the differences in the challenges presented in these neighbourhoods. There are a variety of themes
here but two stand out in particular. The Killinarden site is characterised as being isolated, lacking services
and engagement; Fettercairn is noted for the issues facing African families in particular and the racial abuse
they suffered partly as a result of resentment by some older residents. This latter issue has been manifest also
in written complaints to SDCC by Africans in Fettercairn. Both areas are equally described as being ‘interface’
areas in that they are recently built housing in areas with existing and established working class communities.
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- Isolation and disengagement from collective
organisation

- Anti-social behaviour
- Racial abuse and victimisation of African families

- Estates lacking services in health, transport and
community infrastructure struggling with budget cuts

- Old and new areas and ‘new communities’ Estates
lacking services

- Higher than average concentration of younger families

- Racism based upon poverty – ‘I never had anything’

- Intergenerational educational disadvantage

- Intergenerational educational disadvantage

- Physical bleakness of the area

- Young people excluded in these new areas with lack of
integration with civic infrastructure

- Disengagement from local community based services

- Anti-social Behaviour

- Not integrated with either estate that it joins –
e.g. separate entrances
- Over policed and under protected in spite of good
community policing
- Anti-social behaviour interpreted as lack respect for
cleanliness of estate; under-supervision of children;
bullying of children; and littering as distinct from official
definitions of ASB.

From the stakeholder descriptions of the pilot sites it appears that the context for community safety work
is compounded by issues that go beyond the existence of anti-social behaviour and the affective safety of
neighbourhoods. While stakeholders have been mobilised around the former, it appears from these descriptions
that (note again the prominence of ISOLATION and RACISM) the picture is much more complex. It appears from
these data that a more joined up problem exists that involves housing policy and practice, the multi-cultural
nature of Irish society, alongside the continuing and ongoing marginality and exclusion of people living on the
periphery of the city.
The Audit carried out by RCs in the Killinarden site did not appear to pick up on the existence of anti-social
behaviour. However interviews with staff from a key agency there reveal that the experiences of tenants and
the housing association with anti-social behaviour, differ qualitatively from any official definition of it:
People pick up rubbish after themselves and some people don’t. People see their neighbour not
emptying their bin properly and dumping stuff and not picking up stuff. Some people say that’s
awful. I don’t want it (to live here) you know. As small as that as it could be kids out playing at
night as it could be to real anti-social behaviour. There is an issue there of a problem of active
drug dealing at certain times and that goes on in the car park. And that happens because
people can get in and people can get out…..Our measurement of it might be different to the
Council’s– we meet with the Guards and the Council regularly – we would talk to them and be
presenting problems to them in terms of anti social behaviour and they would smile at us and
say well ‘this is child’s stuff lads compared to what’s going on in other parts of Tallaght’, do you
know what I mean.
(Key Stakeholder 1, Killinarden Site)



While both areas were chosen on the basis of different manifestations of ‘anti-social behaviour’ there is a
realisation amongst the stakeholders that what they are dealing with is a much more complex and embedded
set of problems and issues that go well beyond this manifestation.
Both pilot sites and the older housing areas in which they were placed, crystallise the time in which they were
built. The original housing in both Fettercairn and Killinarden was constructed in the 1970s and 1980s as part
of a process of population dispersal from the Inner City and from public housing in areas such as Drimnagh
and Crumlin (see MacLaran and Punch 2004; Bowden 2006). In this regard, both pilot sites are considered to
be interface areas between the old and the new, and consequently, each reflecting an older and newer version
of community in Ireland. What enters the frame in this regard is that the context for community safety as a
practice is social cohesion and the management of new sources of tension and conflict:
We picked those two estates because they were relatively new both of them as pilot sites. And
there were particular issues in Fettercairn in that there was a peculiar mixture of tenants. There
was a feeling that there was racism going on there. There was in particular migrants from
African countries and also from eastern European countries. So there was a feeling that the
existing houses, beside the new estate were feeling put upon and maybe a little… I don’t know
there was a lot of comparing going on. So there was a little bit of racism bubbling up and that’s
why we picked there.
(SDCC staff 3)
Focus group data with stakeholders in the Fettercairn area reveals this issue also:
Participant
1:
I remember probably going back a couple years ago there was some ASB started around the parade
maybe by residents of the older houses. The young people (.) sparked by what you said, people got
these new houses facing on to the old houses that were looking so attractive. That did create tension in
the area. And ASB started to pick up.
3:

As [name] said there the people looking over – the first thing they probably notice is that there is lots of
non-nationals in there you know and sometimes the non-nationals have been a bit of an easy target,
because they don’t know their way around or they don’t know whose the local young lads are.

MB: They don’t have roots in the area?
3:

They don’t have roots in the area. Where ever they came from different parts of Ireland even. So
definitely they were targeted.

2:

Combined with that there is a sense of injustice maybe that you are looking across at the new facility.

3:

Yeah, yeah and the jealousy factor and they are looking over and saying in their head ‘well these people
are coming in from outside the country and they are getting a brand new house and I’m here in a leaky
house’. There was definitely a bit of that going on.

Both pilot sites have a more socially and culturally heterogeneous set of tenants than the estates in which they
are hosted. The development at the Killinarden site was constructed to make a smoother boundary between a
mixed tenure estate and an established council estate:



And the problem up there with the interface, it was a settled community on one side more
or less. The kids had grown up and departed and the new families, a lot of lone parents with
young children, babies in the main part when they began there, and there wasn’t a natural
cohesion between them. Why would there be? So the main difficulties up there were isolation,
not feeling part of the greater [mixed tenure estate] build which has many other aspects, private
and mixed and social housing as well. But then not feeling you were part of the community
you were facing across the road [council estate], so there was definite feelings of isolation and
nobody was connecting into community centres, football teams youth clubs or anything like
that.
(SDCC staff 1)
The experiences of people living at the Killinarden site appear to manifest in a sense of isolation and separation
from both estates. The residents are seen to live with this problem of being neither one nor the other:
[T]hey are still part of your community. It’s not another estate. Half of them are considered
[council estate]. There’s different entrances – the entrance to the pilot site is through [the council
estate] but if you are in a car you can’t access the rest of [mixed tenure estate] you’d have to
come in from Kiltipper. The roads are subdivided. They are part of A but you have to go in
through B. Do you understand – subtle. And then does that cause ‘well I live in A but you have
to come in through B’. Do you know what I am saying – just subtle differences.
(Key Community Stakeholder, Killinarden Site)
In new estates people are out at work and they are not back to 7 or 8 in the evening. It can be
a hard thing. People had the lack of facilities in the 70s and 80s to unite them. That’s not there
now. People are out at work and it can be hard to get them involved in the community.
(Key Community Stakeholder, Killinarden Site)
In summary, stakeholders’ descriptions of the context seem to reflect a wider frame in which they were carrying
out their work and in doing so they reveal the breadth and depth of the challenges that the Initiative worked
with in this phase of its development.
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In each pilot area the RAPID co-ordinators used local networks of contacts to bring together local community
safety steering committees. They were also involved in calling door to door to conduct a safety survey and to
make contact with local residents. The RCs moved quickly and expeditiously to establish these local participation
structures. In Fettercairn a youth sub-committee was also established involving key actors such as the Tallaght
Youth Service (KEY Project) and the local Community Garda. The structures were seen as critical for bringing a
‘community voice’ to the process. Local steering committees met and agreed upon key actions that would be
taken in relation to identified issues in each pilot site.
Agencies reported positively on the process for the time that it was in train but were keen that the process
should be longer term and sustained. Summing up this view a key stakeholder pointed out:



I certainly saw it as added value to work with them to try and engage with our tenants and
link things in and in some ways that did happen. It’s the continuity of it or the sustainment
of it as an ongoing process is more difficult right. And some of it was like they had money to
do a Christmas event and bits and pieces like that and the tenants would engage in it but the
sustainment of that is… that is the difficult bit.
(Key Stakeholder 2, Killinarden Site)

.H\$FWLRQVLQ3LORW6LWHV
Once these structures were in place a series of activities were mobilised. In both areas, community events
were hosted including Christmas parties, clean ups, coffee mornings as a means of making contact with the
community. The acquisition of resources such as locks for wheelie bins, soccer goal posts and security fencing
were mobilised as a way of achieving ‘quick wins’. These were designed to mobilise the community quickly and
to begin the process of building credibility for the Initiative in the hope of progressing:
[You] had to get the quick wins. People had to see they were getting some reward – and
let them bring that back in and say well where I live it’s a nice place to live. I could see the
progression – when people see they get involved they can move on to something else.
(Senior SDCC Staff 1)
In addition, the RCs were involved in dealing with particular problems in estates that were causing stress to
particular families as identified by the local steering committees. One of these stressors involved inappropriate
congregations by young people, nuisance behaviour and damage to property, together with areas in estates
that were unfinished and unsightly (fuller outline of these already in section 2). A summary of key actions in
each site is outlined in figure 3.2 below.
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Christmas Party
Coffee Mornings;

Christmas Party
Coffee Mornings;

None;

Erection of fencing at key locations;
Erection of steel gates on porticos;
Wheelie bin locks / chains
CCTV in specific sites;

Social Crime Prevention Measures
(aimed at promoting pro-social
behaviour);

None;

Youth intervention
Funding for programme and
equipment for youth service;
Use of restorative practice at
community centre;

Traffic Safety and Environmental
Improvements;

“Children At Play” signs
Landscaping of unfinished
boundaries;
Planting workshops;

None;

Community Events;
Situational Crime Prevention
Measures (aimed at reducing
opportunities for crime and nuisance
behaviour);



Key actors had a variety of perceptions of the main actions taken. When viewed this way it is clear that each
agency and stakeholder interpreted what they thought was happening from their own perspective and that
of their agency. What is critical here is that the mechanisms named by stakeholders are only a reflection of the
actual process in action. The summary (Figure 3.3) of responses to questions on the key identified mechanisms
reveals a richness in the stakeholders’ perceptions of what strategies and activities were deployed. Figure 3.3
presents a chart of the in vivo phrases used by stakeholders in their interviews.
)LJXUH6XPPDU\RI6WDNHKROGHU1DPHG.H\$FWLRQV0HFKDQLVPV
Theme
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Community Safety
Manual:

- Manual as a mainstreaming tool;
- Tool for choosing sites systematically;
- Input by RCs to Manual;
- Manual works on a different timeframe to community development process;
- Questionnaire as ‘simple’ – departed from Manual.

Inter Agency
Approach
and Network
Relationships:

- Freeing SDCC staff to act in integrated way;
- Conversation, linkages, relationship;
- RAPID resolved earlier issues as they had existing ‘in’;
- Use of existing stock of goodwill / networks;
- Bringing community together via coffee mornings;
- Estate management got into the process and lent their; good will, contacts and knowledge.

Community Input:

- Mobilising community voice.

Structures,
Organisation and
Process:

- CET meetings key mechanism – worked well;
- Worked through initial wariness together;
- Deployment of council officials with wide community / local development and social
inclusion brief.

Implementation:

- Problem solving and using RP as a resource to this;
- Council action on safety issues based upon information;
- Putting responsibility back to parents via Gardai where appropriate;
- Redirecting young people to youth services.

Key Resources:

- Use of small budget for (i) youth intervention;
(ii) case by case situational measures;
- Small budget and quick wins good as action and immediate benefit.

Some Critical Views:

- No new mechanisms – existing repertoire of community development and housing staff;
- Committees good but erratic and some lapses in communication;
- Would not have prioritised a community safety initiative to meet needs.

 7KH5ROHRIWKH/RFDO$XWKRULW\LQ&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\
The principal mechanism that was mobilised by the Initiative was the resources of the SDCC. The value of these
resources was not underestimated by any party and was the result of conscious action on the part of CDI in
making the investment, in terms of funding. The SDCC resources included:
ō The ability of RCs to focus on small, targeted communities, due to CDI funding;
ō The extensive community networks established by RAPID Co-ordinators over more than a decade;
ō The stock of goodwill both within the SDCC itself (staff to staff) and between the Council and other
agencies, especially An Garda Síochána;
ō The ability to channel and prioritise Council action and resources to pilot sites if required;
ō The €5,000 budget per site provided by CDI to lever other resources.



Key to delivering this phase of the Initiative was an organisational culture in the SDCC that sees the value of
engagement with tenants and residents in its area. The Council saw as central to this communication strategy,
the retention of the RAPID co-ordinators post 2009 as the Government withdrew funding for RAPID. A Council
official pointed out:
Rather than sitting around the table they were able to get out there and have that conversation.
People need a voice and they need to be given a chance to do it separately – if they don’t
want it done publically. [The RAPID officers] can go out and have the conversation and feed it
back into the Council team. CDI brings together the co-ordination of that. The RAPID has better
contact outside the meetings; by having that conversation – its important how you deliver things
– how you communicate.
(Senior SDCC Staff 1)
An alternative view on this mobilisation of the RAPID staff questioned why this phase of the CDI Community
Safety Initiative invested in activity apparently already being carried out by the SDCC. It was held by some
stakeholders that there were no new mechanisms used and in effect no new action repertoires put in place. Put
simply, SDCC staff did exactly what they would be doing ordinarily irrespective of the CDI funding and the CDI
Manual for the Initiative. On this view it follows that the SDCC RAPID staff were merely extending their brief
for a period albeit that they could focus their efforts on two very small sites. In addition some sentiment was
expressed that the value of input from local community centres remained unpaid and undervalued. Indeed the
very goodwill that the RAPID staff was able to use to effect the successful implementation of the Initiative, was
not included in any direct flow of funding. While these views were a minority among stakeholders interviewed,
they were held very strongly by very experienced people with considerable community respect.
While taking account of this view, the impact of the Initiative in the period of implementation should be
underlined as follows:
ō The mobilisation of a wide community of practice around community safety; and,
ō The raising of awareness of community safety as a framework of practice for achieving greater security
and safety in neighbourhoods and across the area as a whole.
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There was a view that the programme over focused upon events. The events were designed to raise community
spirit and to establish credibility for the Initiative. These events, it is widely acknowledged, have had a positive
effect on making contacts and forming relationships. A small but significant stakeholder voice questioned the
precise connection of these events to the logic model and to the production of community safety. This issue
was also raised by the evaluators in the earlier phase of the Initiative (Kearns et al, 2013) who questioned the
assumption made by CDI that community events would somehow generate affective safety.
It’s hard to engage community involvement – people are busy and people are struggling and
that can be a challenge. There was a willingness to see what people wanted. There was an
overemphasis on events and parties – they are successful but I am not sure how aware would
people have been that these were tied to a community safety Initiative? As opposed to ‘I am
here for a Halloween party’ or whatever it was. But it aided with the whole thing that this thing
was more visible. It is a great Initiative to have that there but I don’t think people realised that is
what they were attending. Good at engaging people but people might not have realised what



they meant. It had benefits to the RAPID co-ordinators who would follow up on the little things
– small but significant things and practical things can make a difference.
(Stakeholder, service agency)
Another way in which this issue was raised was whether the focus should be on safety or on the process
of developing the community more broadly. The needs of the residents in the site at Killinarden derive from
their relative isolation. In spite of temporary lifts in morale and community spirit there, the area still lacks play
facilities for children and feelings of safety are largely unchanged (explored further in findings from the survey).
This results in parents keeping their children indoors: houses open out onto the access road and there is little
green space, while those that are available, appear to not welcome children playing:
And that [end of the street] where a tenant is always giving out about he doesn’t want the kids
there and like it’s half the size of that fecking table and he doesn’t want the kids playing there.
Now I can see both points: why he doesn’t want the children there. They’re playing football,
they’re lashing it at the wall and his windows are getting hit. But it is the only bit of green that
they have. You know they can’t play on that green because of him and they can’t play on that
green because of the needles.
(Focus group participant, Resident Killinarden site)
These issues are critical to the development of community safety policy and practice but the phase of the
Initiative to which they refer only lasted one year and so the community events and the ‘quick wins’ should be
viewed in that context.
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In addition to the common actions taken on both pilot sites, the CET through its consultations in the Fettercairn
site, identified a group of young people who were attributed with being the cause of anti social behaviour and
nuisance to residents there. A youth sub group comprised of key actors such as the Community Garda, the
KEY Project (a GYDP) and local residents identified the particular young people through their combined local
knowledge. The Community Safety Steering Group identified this group as ‘hard to reach’ young people. A
strategy to engage this group and ensure that they were using the services available to them locally, was set in
train. The intervention specifically involved:
ō Identifying the young people concerned.
ō A senior Garda (and in some cases the ASB Officer of the SDCC) visiting the parents of these young
people to present ‘future scenarios’ of continued behaviour up to and including outlining implications
for the resident’s tenancy agreement.
ō Follow-up visits or meetings with Garda and ASB officer to review change and progress.
ō Utilising the CDI Restorative Practice training and subsequently an intervention with the young
people to ensure that they could use the Fettercairn Community Centre once they worked within
agreed guidelines.
ō Funding the Tallaght Youth Service to enable interventions with a particular group of young people.
ō Deploying temporary youth resource workers to engage with young people aged 10-16 in the local
community centre in the early summer of 2012.
ō Referring young people to the KEY Project, a Garda Youth Diversion Project.



The effect of this intervention was, as noted by key stakeholders, to have effectively terminated anti-social
behaviour in the Fettercairn development. Combined with the situational measures, the Initiative managed
to sever the opportunities for anti-social behaviour to occur and it diverted the particular young people to
alternative activities both in the local community centre and in the KEY Project. This combined both situational
and social crime prevention measures to great effect. Stakeholders in general acknowledged that this had a
positive impact on the quality of life for the residents of Fettercairn in particular. Describing the whole process,
a Garda pointed out:
[The RAPID Co-ordinator] pulled off a masterstroke. […] We identified, we inhibited the bad
behaviour. I’d visit and bring the ASB Officer from the SDCC with me. [The RC] noticed that they
had been causing damage at the community centre. There was a lack of buy in from these
youngsters [edit] and they were victimising all the other groups with their behaviour. [The RC]
used the RP and he held a half-day meeting between the staff and these youngsters. And he
used the RP as the format and they understood how they were being abused and their trust
was being abused; they were deliberately being disruptive and it couldn’t go on. These people
were working and providing a service to the community. You use this facility but you can’t use
it unless we can come to an understanding. The damage has gone down through the floor. You
appeal to their incipient rationality.
(Key Stakeholder, Garda)
While acknowledging the progress made here with this intervention, interviews and focus group participation
by young people and youth service personnel produced a slightly more nuanced account of these actions.
Many of the young people who appeared on ‘the list’ were already engaged by the youth services in some form
or other. The temporary youth resource personnel engaged a wide age range from 10 to 16, mixing young
children with young people with more challenging behaviours; but as one youth worker noted:
“Their needs are complex and won’t be fixed in a summer”
While the youth intervention was in part successful, it was suggested by some that there was a partial
displacement effect. A group of young people on seeing that their places to congregate in the estates were
being closed off by the situational crime prevention measures, and notwithstanding their participation in youth
services activity, relocated their spontaneous congregating to an unsupervised area in an adjacent housing
estate.
Participant
1:
There’s a lot of young people keep their horses up there and there’s a lot of ASB there at the moment
I think. Certain young people that participate in the KEY project who would have been involved in the
ASB in Fettercairn they are kind of focused in this area here and as you can see from this photograph
it is a lot more unsafe than Fettercairn was. It’s hidden away a bit more and there’s all sorts of debris on
the ground there, although Kilmartin is a much more settled estate compared with Fettercairn. The
residents there would be stronger but it’s out of sight and out of mind as well. I think that there are
going to be issues with this particular site.
2:



I suppose that thing of making these improvements and stuff is actually is not preventing the problem
but it’s moving the problem to somewhere where we can’t see.
Stakeholders later clarified that that it was Tallaght Youth Service who organised the Restorative Practice session mentioned in this
extract. Staff at the youth service had undertaken RP training organised by CDI.
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MB: Right. So there’s still issues to be addressed by the Initiative do you think? Around some of the physical
improvements?
1:
I think the physical improvements had a huge positive impact for the life of the residents that are living
around there [Fettercairn], definitely, without a doubt. But I could just see some of those issues occurring
now in Kilmartin.
It should be noted that SDCC and the Gardaí confirmed that there were no reports of ASB pertaining to
the site in question and no incidents or complaints were recorded from residents in Kilmartin. There was no
displacement of ASB to the Kilmartin site. The Community Safety Steering Committee had been concerned
with this issue itself: it noted in relation to the CCTV camera, that young people were moving out of its gaze.
A lesson here it seems is that community safety measures must take account of the potential leakage or
displacement effect that can result from situational crime prevention measures in one area.
While the displacement of anti social behaviour was not a factor here, there appears to be a lesson for
all concerned about the redistribution of risk. While the quality of life of the residents was improved, it
unintentionally had the effect of exposing young people to risk as they moved to a location where there was
an absence of soft surveillance typical of more public settings.
If safety is a public good then how it is distributed fairly appears to be a challenge to community safety work.
Should safety be seen as a universal or selective entitlement? While discussing safety issues in the community
with a group of young people, some of whom had been defined as ‘hard to reach’ and ‘the perpetrators’, their
own sense of security was raised. While discussing how congregating in groups in the neighbourhood might
be seen as intimidating for others, participants raised the need to walk around in groups because they feared
being victims if they didn’t:
Participant
MB: Where would you feel unsafe. Do you feel safe in Fettercairn?
1:

Yeah. Cos it’s our home like.

2:

You know people in Fettercairn, you’re grand like.

1:

Yeah. You’re home you know. Nothing is going to happen to you. But say you are walking though
Springfield and all and that’s like, you don’t really feel safe. You have to keep watching around.

3:

If you are walking around the GAA club or up near the school like, I don’t feel safe walking up that road
on me own.

MB: What would make that safer if you were walking in Springfield, what would make that safer for you?
3:

If I had a few people with me, like more than one or two, have a few people with me’ (Focus group,
young people, Fettercairn).

This point resonates with research on young people’s ‘territoriality’ where they identify with a given space.
Territoriality can be manifested in conflict and fear based upon their contact with groups from corresponding
neighbourhoods. This is a feature of urban working class neighbourhoods that cuts them off from the city
and potentially leads to their criminalisation (Kintrea et al, 2010). A related issue here is how young people are
categorised as either victim or perpetrator. This was an intense issue raised by one young participant that grasped
the attention of the entire group. If he was a victim, he pointed out, would he be believed given his status in the
community? These are interesting challenges in trying to develop a fully inclusive community safety practice.
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 6XPPDU\RI,PSDFWDQG.H\2XWFRPHV
The Initiative managed to set up new connections and lines of communication between the stakeholders and
this was identified as a positive outcome in itself. For the SDCC RAPID staff the process has proved invaluable
as a means of learning the techniques of achieving safety in newly built estates that have not yet settled. One
RAPID co-ordinator was actively using the learning in other estates since the Initiative completed in 2012.
There is a strong sense also that the strategy of quick wins had immediate effects on the safety and wellbeing
of households, particularly those that benefited from bespoke prevention and security measures. Against this
stakeholders point towards issues of sustainability and maintenance of the mechanisms put in place and the
need to continue the engagement of people through a longer term community development process. The quick
wins dealt with the initial causes of stress to families but these need to be consistently revisited and maintained.
While the Initiative was an effective collaboration between CDI and the SDCC, this phase has been characterised
by the relative absence of community capacity building. This is partly a consequence of the brevity of the
implementation timeline: it is widely understood by stakeholders that community development operates within
a longer frame.
The youth intervention at Fettercairn was successful at achieving the objective of dealing with safety of
households in this area. Residents and stakeholders have pointed out the effective termination of anti-social
behaviour by the group that were included in the Initiative. However well meaning and well thought out this
aspect of the Initiative was there is evidence that these measures had the effect of moving young people
to another area. This matter is less to do with the displacement of anti-social behaviour and more about
amplifying risks for the young people involved. In addition it appears that there is a need to be clearer about
referral processes to avoid multiplying or complicating interventions as youth service staff were emphatic that
many of those deemed ‘hard to reach’ already had some level of engagement in the youth service.
The use of the Restorative Practice training was seen as a critical addition to the effectiveness of the Initiative
in both sites but primarily in Fettercairn where it was said to give the agencies working together a common
language and understanding. When deployed by youth service staff in the case of the Fettercairn Community
Centre, it had the desired effect of creating a win-win for both staff of the Centre and the young people who
were included. The young people continue to use the facility and this is a very positive outcome.
The supportive networks created around the Initiative and the links created with the African residents of
Fettercairn have also had a positive impact on how African families engage with the community and the
services of the community centre especially at Fettercairn. Critical here also is the bringing together of key
members of the community with services providers: a process that was enhanced by the Initiative.
Apart from the quick wins in building some community engagement in the Killinarden site, there is a strong
sense from stakeholders that the wider needs of the area driving feelings of insecurity and isolation remain in
place and have been unaltered by the Initiative. Asked if community safety is a worthwhile thing to do, focus
group participants suggest that it might have worked but also point towards the need for a holistic preventative
and developmental approach that includes play space, community engagement and services in order to counter
their sense of isolation:



Participant
1:
If an area has the potential. I don’t think that area has the potential to be safe. I think its gone too long
and too far now. I think at the beginning I think they could have changed areas. There is a whole empty
car park on that road at the bottom.
2:

If someone was to come in and bring that back together because we have put there and dumped there
and “fend for yourselves” here. But I think if they had more involvement like youth clubs, something to
engage kids, engage the neighbours also.

 &RQFOXVLRQ
This Chapter has outlined the principal themes identified in interviews and focus groups with stakeholders. A
critical issue concerns the limited timeframe for the Initiative and to a considerable extent it was only possible
to achieve quick, immediate results. The challenges facing the RCs in implementing the Initiative in Fettercairn
were decidedly more complicated than those at the Killinarden site (see 2.8 and 3.3 above). In the former the
Initiative did more: it adopted a strategy that included both quick wins, the youth intervention and the use
of the Restorative Practice techniques. Doing more might explain why stakeholders there say that it had an
immediate observable effect on anti-social behaviour in the neighbourhood. This issue is further examined in
some of the findings from the household survey.

36

&KDSWHUɗ5HVXOWVIURPWKH+RXVHKROG6XUYH\

,QWURGXFWLRQDQG3URğOHRI5HVSRQGHQWV
A survey of households in the two pilot sites was conducted using a pre-designed questionnaire. The
questionnaire was administered by community fieldworkers who were contracted by CDI. The fieldworkers
were briefed and trained by the DIT research team. The questionnaire sought some demographic information
from the respondents together with what experience they had of the Initiative. The questionnaire also asked
respondents to self-report on their feelings of safety. As distinct approaches were taken in each of the two sites,
results from the survey will be presented by site to enable comparison.
The two pilot sites consist of 176 households: Killinarden is larger with 102 households and Fettercairn with 74.
The total number of households that it was possible for fieldworkers to visit was 174 in that two households
units appeared to be unoccupied. The total number of completed questionnaires returned to the research team
was 86 resulting in an average response rate of 49.4% (Table 4.1).
The survey aimed to access all households in the estate. Fieldworkers made between three and four calls to
households before recording a non-response. The survey is a non-random sample and hence its generalisability
is limited to the housing estates concerned.
7DEOH+RXVHKROG6XUYH\5HVSRQVH5DWH
Pilot Area

Valid
Households

Completed
Questionnaires
n

Response
Rate
%

Killinarden

102

46

45.1

Fettercairn

72

40

55.5

Total



86



The majority of respondents were female (approx 73% in both sites) and the modal age cohort was 25-44.
Almost half (48%) of respondents in Killinarden were single (table 4.2) compared with just over one third
(35%) in the Fettercairn site. Between them the households in the sample had 199 children (94 Killinarden; 105
Fettercairn). The average number of children per household was 2.19 for Killinarden site compared with 2.65
Fettercairn (Table 4.3).
7DEOH0DULWDO6WDWXVRI5HVSRQGHQWV
0DULWDO6WDWXV

6LQJOH

Married

&RKDELWLQJ

6HSDUDWHG
'LYRUFHG

:LGRZ HU

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

Killinarden

22

47.8

15

32.6

5

10.9

4

8.7

0

0

Fettercairn

13

32.5

14

35.0

7

17.5

2

5.0

4

10.0
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7DEOH1XPEHURI&KLOGUHQLQ+RXVHKROG
1XPEHURI&KLOGUHQ

.LOOLQDUGHQ
N households

)HWWHUFDLUQ
N households

0

4

1

1

42

39

2

33

34

3

10

21

4

5

9

5

3

2

6

1

0

Mean per Household

2.19

2.65

Respondents were from a variety of national, cultural and racial backgrounds. In terms of nationality, the
Killinarden is more homogenously Irish (93.5%) compared with Fettercairn which appears to have a wider
distribution of nationalities in that 77.5% are Irish nationals compared with 22.5% who said they were either
Nigerian, Bulgarian, Congolese, Ghanaian, English or Somalian.
)LJXUHD(WKQLFDQG5DFLDO'LIIHUHQFHV.LOOLQDUGHQ

Data on racial / ethnic background reveals the distinct make up of each of the pilot areas. The data reflect
the commonly held view that Fettercairn is the more racially heterogeneous of the two sites: compared with
Killinarden, a quarter of the respondents are Black African or Black Irish-African. Killinarden participants were
comprised of 87% white Irish in contrast with Fettercairn 62%.



)LJXUHE(WKQLFDQG5DFLDO'LIIHUHQFHV)HWWHUFDLUQ

Both pilot areas have distinct housing profiles. Almost all respondents, apart from some unspecified exceptions,
have rental tenures, i.e. none were owner-occupiers or private rented tenants. In Killinarden the majority of
respondents (38 or 82.6%) rent from a housing association compared with the minority who rent from the local
authority (7 or 15%). In contrast, all of the respondents in Fettercairn were local authority tenants.
More than half of respondents in Fettercairn reported that they had a burglar alarm while in Killinarden, 20
(50%) respondents reported that they had an alarm system installed. When compared with the national rate
for monitored burglar alarms of 15%, the pilot areas have a much lower level of access to monitored alarm
systems than nationally. However, with 50% and 35% in the pilot areas having a non-monitored alarm, the
rate is higher than the national figure of 27% of households with non-monitored alarm systems (CSO, 2010).
A small number indicated that they had their own CCTV camera or had a watch dog.
7DEOH$FFHVVWR3ULYDWH6HFXULW\*RRGV
Monitored Burglar
Alarm

Non-Monitored
Alarm

Other

None

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

Killinarden

4

8.7

16

34.8

0

-

25

56.5

Fettercairn

2

5.0

20

50.0

5

12.5

13

32.5

National



15%

27%

42%

 7KH&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\,QLWLDWLYH
Data were gathered in relation to awareness of, participation in the activities of, and intense engagement in
the Community Safety Initiative. The majority of respondents in both sites reported that they were not aware
of the Initiative (Killinarden Site = 63%; Fettercairn Site = 55%). However given that the Initiative had ended in
the summer of 2012, significant numbers were aware that the Initiative had taken place (see analysis below).
Respondents were asked in their own words what they understood the Community Safety Initiative to be as
selectively summarised in Figure 4.2.3 Most said that they thought it was about safety in the home and the
community and to encourage neighbours to work together. A smaller number of responses indicated that they
didn’t know what it was.
)LJXUH6HOHFWLRQRI4XDOLWDWLYH5HVSRQVHVWRŁ:KDWGR\RXNQRZWKH&6,WREHDERXW"ł
“To improve families lives and safety of this area. I heard from my neighbours.”
“Working with the children and the council to stop anti social behaviour. Trying to make
improvements.”
“Aware of work in [another area]. Know of the work but not definite details”.
“Safety and beauty of the place.”
“Took part in clean up day noticed signs around for road safety.”
“They come to help improve the area. They put up fencing to stop squatters in the area.”
“Haven’t heard anything about CSI.”
“There are Garda involved in CSI. Camera’s are not monitored. Meetings not regular enough”.
“Good communication, safety for children”.
“To check some things in the community and to make sure people feel safe”.

The questionnaire sought to estimate whether households were aware of the RAPID Co-ordinators implementing
the Community Safety Initiative and most were not aware. Equally, the majority in both areas had not met the
RAPID Co-ordinator after being prompted with the co-ordinators’ names. In Fettercairn however, 40% of
respondents had met with the RCs, yet only 17.4% reported that they were aware of their implementation of
the Initiative. Interestingly, in Fettercairn respondents who reported meeting with the RCs said they met them
on average 1.88 times which was more than twice the average for Killinarden. This perhaps reflects differences
in activity levels between sites and indicates that there was greater penetration into the site at Fettercairn.
However when asked if respondents were directly involved or had family members involved in the Initiative a
higher proportion of respondents in Killinarden reported that their household was involved.

3

The full verbatim data are presented in Appendix 3.



7DEOH$ZDUHQHVVRI(QJDJHPHQWZLWKDQG,QYROYHPHQWLQ&65$3,'
.LOOLQDUGHQ
%

)HWWHUFDLUQ
%

<HV

No

<HV

No

Aware of RAPID Co-ordinators & CS

21.7

76.1

17.4

82.6

Met with Rapid Co-ordinators

17.4

82.6

40.0

60.0

Involved Personally in CS*

21.7

76.1

15.0

82.5

Family Member Involved*

13.0

76.1

2.5

97.4

*Small number of missing values due to non-response to the question.

As part of the Initiative a series of events was held to encourage the participation of residents on both sites.
Christmas parties were held in December 2011; two coffee mornings were held in Fettercairn Community Centre
and one in Killinarden Community Centre in February 2012. Also in February 2012, a flyer was distributed to
households advertising events and services available. Specific clean up events were held at the Killinarden site
as well as a hanging basket and planting workshop. Respondents were asked to indicate if they attended any
event; if they did not attend but were aware of it; and if they had received the flyer.
In the Killinarden site attendance at the “Clean Up” was the highest for all at almost 60% and 80% of respondents
said that they were aware of this event (table 4.6). More than two thirds recalled that they had received the
flyer indicating a high degree of penetration of this particular action by the Initiative. Smaller attendances were
recorded at key events such as the Coffee morning and hanging basket workshops but almost a quarter of
respondents said they attended the Christmas party.
7DEOH&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\,QLWLDWLYH(YHQWVDQG$FWLRQVDW.LOOLQDUGHQ
Attended Event

Aware

*Missing values

Event / Action

<HV
%

No
%

<HV
%

No
%

%

Christmas Party

23.9

76.1

41.3

52.2

6.50

Coffee Morning

8.7

91.3

39.1

5.5

4.30

Hanging Basket Workshop

10.9

87.0

45.7

50.0

4.30

Clean Up

58.7

41.3

80.4

15.2

4.30

*Mostly arising from non-response. Values here represent the highest rate for a category.

At Fettercairn, 40% of respondents had attended the Christmas party and three quarters were aware that it
was taking place. The participation at coffee morning events is, as in the Killinarden site, modest but this is
reflective of the fact that not all respondents could possibly be available at this time of the day. Again 60% of
respondents recalled that they had received the flyer advertising services and events.



7DEOH&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\,QLWLDWLYH(YHQWVDQG$FWLRQVDW)HWWHUFDLUQ
Attended Event

Aware

*Missing values

Event / Action

<HV
%

No
%

<HV
%

No
%

%

Christmas Party

42.5

45.0

75.7

22.5

12.5

Coffee Morning 1

12.5

72.5

42.5

47.5

15.0

Coffee Morning 2

15.0

47.5

30.0

37.5

32.5

*Mostly arising from non-response. Values here represent the highest rate for a category.

Notwithstanding the modest attendances at some events, the Initiative managed to achieve a level of dispersal
which was impressive given the limited time in which the RAPID assignment was in train. When asked what
else the Initiative could have done to improve community safety, respondents in general asked for more of the
type of interventions that were initiated, a summary of which is in Appendix 4.

 5HVSRQGHQWVł3HUFHSWLRQVRI6DIHW\DQG&KDQJH
Respondents were asked to indicate their attitude to a set of standard statements about the area. The data
reflect whether they agree / disagree with the statement and the intensity with which they hold this perception.
7DEOH3HUFHLYHG5HGXFWLRQV&ULPH%HKDYLRXUVDQG5HODWHG,VVXHVLQWKH/DVW7ZR<HDUV.LOOLQDUGHQ
6WURQJO\
disagree

Disagree

Neither
DJUHH
disagree

Agree

6WURQJO\
agree

Missing

%

%

%

%

%

%

Less Anti-social behaviour

23.9

39.1

13.0

23.9

-

-

Less Vandalism and graffitti

17.4

39.1

15.2

26.1

2.2

-

Drug use decreased

34.8

19.6

34.8

8.7

2.2

-

Less vandalism

8.7

52.2

17.4

17.4

-

4.3

Less racism

6.5

18.2

47.7

27.3

-

4.3

Less crime

17.4

45.7

19.6

15.2

-

2.2

37

28.3

19.6

10.9

2.2

2.2

Less gang activity

For the Killinarden site the wider perception is that the area has not improved greatly in relation to decreasing
patterns of crime and antisocial behaviour. Clear majorities strongly disagree or disagree that there are felt
decreases in anti social behaviour, graffiti, drug use, vandalism, crime or gang activity. The only departure from
this pattern is in relation to racism: however, interview data reveals that racism was never a major issue for the
Killinarden site. Almost a quarter of respondents agreed that there were some improving patterns especially in
relation to crime (15.2%) and graffiti (26.1%). There are little or no ‘strongly agreed’ perceptions in relation to
any of the statements compared with the distribution for more hardened negative perceptions. The strength of
perception therefore is, on balance, negative (Table 4.8).
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When shown these findings in a focus group, there was emphatic agreement that anti-social behaviour had
not decreased and if anything had got worse. Taking up some of the related findings, two participants revealed
some disagreement in whether graffiti and vandalism had changed, that it produced different effects for them
and that people in parts of the Killinarden site experience the neighbourhood differently.
Participant
MB: When we asked people about if there was less vandalism…
1:

I’d say there’s less graffiti. Vandalism….

2:

I think it’s probably the same.

1:

Like the smashing of the cars and all that but there’s no spray painting and all that has stopped. So the
graffiti has stopped. But not vandalism.

2:

Yeah.

1:

People does be coming back from pubs and smashing car windows for the craic like. I don’t know what
they get out of it but you wake up in the morning and there’s all glass all over the road.

2:

And it could be like two or three cars on the road. It wouldn’t be just one.

MB: How does it make you feel about living in the area?
2:

I hate living there.

1:

I love living there.

2:

I hate it.

1:

I like it, I have no problems. Even the taxi man bringing home me shopping said ‘I’d bet you can’t wait
to get out of here’. But I like it. Why would I want to get out of here? I have me neighbours.

2:

You’ve a lovely end.

The negative tending results for the Killinarden site are borne out when examining responses to the perceptions
of improvements in the quality of life in the area (Table 4.9). Again there are little or no strongly held perceptions
of improvements. Almost 54% disagree that there has been an increased Garda presence while almost one
third were neither agreed nor disagreed. On the plus side more than 40% of respondents in Killinarden perceive
a greater sense of community and approximately 35% perceived that there was a better physical environment
including planting, and less dumping. This might reflect the central focus on environmental improvements and
getting neighbours to know one another better. In general, perceptions are either neutral or negative.
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7DEOH3HUFHSWLRQVRI,PSURYHPHQWVDW&RPPXQLW\/HYHOLQWKH/DVW7ZR<HDUV.LOOLQDUGHQ
6WURQJO\
disagree

Disagree

Neither
DJUHH
disagree

Agree

6WURQJO\
agree

Missing

%

%

%

%

%

%

Increased Garda presence

23.9

29.5

31.8

13.6

-

4.3

Young people have more pride

17.4

43.5

26.1

13.0

-

-

Community feels safer

23.9

29.5

31.8

13.6

-

4.3

Physical environment has
improved

8.7

32.6

23.9

32.6

2.2

-

Better security infrastructure

17.4

56.5

10.9

15.2

-

-

More sense of community

8.7

23.9

21.7

39.1

4.3

2.2

There are more activities for
young people
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28.3

20.0

11.1

2.2

2.2

7DEOH  3HUFHLYHG 5HGXFWLRQV &ULPH %HKDYLRXUV DQG 5HODWHG ,VVXHV LQ WKH /DVW 7ZR <HDUV
)HWWHUFDLUQ
6WURQJO\
disagree

Disagree

Neither
DJUHH
disagree

Agree

6WURQJO\
agree

Missing

%

%

%

%

%

%

Less Anti-social behaviour

17.5

15.0

5.0

55.0

7.5

-

Less Vandalism and graffitti

17.5

25.0

33.3

22.2

-

10.0

Drug use decreased

15.0

22.5

30.0

20.0

2.5

10.0

Less vandalism

17.5

27.5

15.0

35.0

5.0

-

Less racism

22.5

25.0

22.5

27.5

-

2.5

Less crime

2.5

30.0

27.5

40.0

-

Less gang activity

12.5

20.0

17.5

37.5

5.0

7.5

In contrast, the results for perceptions of crime and anti-social behaviour in Fettercairn are somewhat more
positive. For example 62.5% agreed that anti social behaviour decreased in the last two years compared to
under one third who generally disagreed. A total of 40% perceived that there was less vandalism and 42%
agreed that there was less gang activity compared with 32.5% who disagreed. In this category, perceptions
appear to be less strong on the negative side: the finding for decreased anti-social behaviour appears to be the
strongest given that only 5% neither agreed/disagreed (Table 4.10).
A focus group in Fettercairn comprised of service personnel was fairly decisive in tying these findings to specific
actions taken in relation to the physical environment and the youth intervention:



Participant
1:
They are seeing the obvious improvements. The railings, the camera and there was a few other projects
where CSI organised the bins and they were chained and locked. They noticed and would have seen the
input and I’d say that was a factor for this. And also the big thing was that the Guards called to the
parents of the main sort of [people involved] there so they would have known and seen all of that in
action.
MB: Would you think that the kinds of things that the CSI are doing caused that response?
2:

I think so. I think those physical things that people can see definitely would have improved life for them
in Fettercairn. I am just wondering if the survey was given to residents of Fettercairn [as a whole] would
we see the same, it might be a contradiction. I don’t know.

MB: That’s a fair point.
2

But I think the locks, the railings, the increased presence, the camera definitely had an impact for
families living in Fettercairn. It improved life for them.

MB: That’s a good result so really. [nods in agreement].
In relation to the improvements at community level, the positive results for Fettercairn appear to be even
stronger. While there is a clear perception that there has been no increased Garda presence or pride amongst
young people, 57% agreed that there was a greater sense of community, 60% agreed that there was improved
community infrastructure; and 60% perceived that there were more activities for young people. Those with
more negative perceptions appear to hold that view more intensely compared with those who perceive positive
changes (Table 4.11). On balance the results in this table are positive.
This mobilisation of the inter agency response at local level in this pilot site has shown stakeholder agencies
and the community what can be achieved with such collaboration and underlines the impact of the Initiative
at this level.
7DEOH3HUFHSWLRQVRI,PSURYHPHQWVDW&RPPXQLW\/HYHOLQWKHODVW\HDUV)HWWHUFDLUQ
6WURQJO\
disagree

Disagree

Neither
DJUHH
disagree

Agree

6WURQJO\
agree

Missing

%

%

%

%

%

%

Increased Garda presence

17.5

43.6

10.0

25.0

2.6

2.5

Young people have more pride

22.5

27.5

12.5

37.5

-

-

Community feels safer

10.0

27.5

17.5

42.5

2.5

-

Physical environment has
improved

12.5

17.9

7.7

56.4

5.1

2.5

Better security infrastructure

15

25.0

12.5

37.5

2.5

7.5

More sense of Community

2.5

25.0

15.0

45.0

12.5

There are more activities for
young people

17.5

17.5

5.0

45.0

12.5

46

2.5

Reflecting upon their current feelings of safety the questionnaire asked respondents to rate their safety in the
neighbourhood, in their homes and how safe they felt their children were. Results are outlined in Tables 4.12
and 4.13 below for Killinarden and Fettercairn respectively. These self-report responses on affective safety
were analysed alongside participation in Community Safety events to establish if there was an effect of, or an
association with, participation or awareness. No statistically significant results were observed.
7DEOH3HUFHSWLRQVRI6DIHW\.LOOLQDUGHQ
Not at all
safe

A little
unsafe

Neither
safe nor
unsafe

6DIH

&RPSOHWHO\
safe

%

%

%

%

%

As a place to live, do you feel that your
community/ neighbourhood is

15.2

34.8

17.4

30.4

2.2

How safe do you feel in your home?

4.4

13.3

6.7

60.0

15.6

How safe do you feel your children are?

11.9

14.3

14.3

50.0

9.5

Respondents in Killinarden appear to feel relatively safe in their homes –three quarters of the residents surveyed
said they were safe or completely safe, compared with less than 20% who were not safe or a little safe. This
contrasts somewhat with feelings of safety in the neighbourhood as a whole where only a third feel safe
compared with half who said they were not safe or only a little unsafe. Almost 60% report that they felt their
children were safe compared with 12% who felt their children were unsafe as graphically displayed in Figure
4.2 below.
)LJXUH3HUFHSWLRQVRI&KLOG6DIHW\LQ.LOOLQDUGHQ
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7DEOH3HUFHSWLRQVRI6DIHW\)HWWHUFDLUQ
Not at all
safe

A little
unsafe

Neither
safe nor
unsafe

6DIH

&RPSOHWHO\
safe

%

%

%

%

%

As a place to live, do you feel that your
community/ neighbourhood is

12.5

25.0

17.5

42.5

2.5

How safe do you feel in your home?

15.0

7.5

7.5

60.0

10.0

How safe do you feel your children are?

18.4

21.1

7.9

47.4

5.3

In Fettercairn the proportion of respondents saying they felt the neighbourhood was safe or completely safe is
45% which contrasts with 32% in the Killinarden site. Seventy percent of Fettercairn respondents say they felt
safe in their homes. A lower proportion of residents felt their children were safe in Fettercairn when contrasted
with Killinarden (52.7 % compared with 60%) and correspondingly 19% said they felt their children were not
at all safe and 21% only a little unsafe. Put in other words, a sizeable minority of residents (40%) expressed
concern in relation to their children’s safety which is much higher than for Killinarden.
)LJXUH3HUFHSWLRQVRI&KLOG6DIHW\LQ)HWWHUFDLUQ

In both pilot sites, respondents reported having experienced a wide range of crimes and incivilities. Unsurprisingly
there are higher frequencies for neighbourhood incivilities such as graffiti and littering in the neighbourhood
compared with personal assaults and burglaries. However these rates of victimisation for the latter category are
relatively high given that the Crime Victimisation data from the Quarterly National Household Budget Survey
2010 gives a national figure of 3% for burglary and 1% for assault. In addition the local figures for car theft
(15% and 13%) are also alarmingly high when compared with the national figure of 1%, albeit that the number
of cases in this survey are small.
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7DEOH'LVWULEXWLRQRI+RXVHKROGV([SHULHQFLQJ&ULPHDQG,QFLYLOLWLHVLQ/DVW7ZR<HDUV
.LOOLQDUGHQ

)HWWHUFDLUQ

n

%

n

%

Burglary

10

21.7

12

30

Theft other than at home

14

30.4

17

42.5

Theft of car

6

13

6

15

Theft item from car

9

19.6

11

27.5

Personal assault

10

21.7

10

25

Personal intimidation

16

34.8

25

62.5

Vandalism to home

11

22.9

20

50

Graffiti to home

5

10.9

12

30

Graffiti in neighbourhood

30

65.3

27

67.5

Littering to home

18

39.1

23

57.5

Littering in neighbourhood

38

82.6

36

90

Looking at the frequency of victimisation for Killinarden, with the exception of litter and graffiti, the majority of
residents have never been victims of the listed crimes e.g. 78% in the case of burglary. In general while victimisation
is a feature of life, it is infrequent as the data are clustered in one side of the table (see tables 4.15 and 4.16).
7DEOH&ULPH9LFWLPLVDWLRQDQG,QFLYLOLWLHVLQ1HLJKERXUKRRG.LOOLQDUGHQ
.LOOLQDUGHQ

Never

A few
2QFHD
times a
Month or
\HDURUOHVV
Less

A few
times per
month

A few
times a
ZHHN

(YHU\GD\

Missing
Values

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

Burglary

78.2

21.7

-

-

-

-

-

Theft other then home

69.6

30.4

-

-

-

-

-

Theft car

82.6

13.6

-

-

-

-

4.3

Theft item car

76.1

21.7

-

-

-

-

4.3

Personal assault

76.1

21.7

-

-

-

-

2.2

Personal intimidation

65.2

32.6

2.2

-

-

-

-

Vandalism home

76.1

21.7

2.2

-

-

-

-

Graffiti home

89.1

10.9

-

-

-

-

-

Graffiti neighbourhood

34.8

60.9

2.2

-

-

-

-

Litter home

60.9

26.1

2.2

-

-

-

-

Litter neighbourhood

17.4

67.4

-

-

-

-

-



Victimisation in Fettercairn appears to follow a similar pattern (Table 4.16) but data for some categories e.g.
litter in the neighbourhood and graffiti in the neighbourhood, show that a small number of respondents
experience these acts.
7DEOH&ULPH9LFWLPLVDWLRQDQG,QFLYLOLWLHVLQ1HLJKERXUKRRG)HWWHUFDLUQ
.LOOLQDUGHQ

Never

A few
2QFHD
times a
Month or
\HDURUOHVV
Less

A few
times per
month

A few
times a
ZHHN

(YHU\GD\

Missing
Values

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

Burglary

70.0

25.0

2.5

2.5

-

-

-

Theft other then home

57.5

40.0

2.5

-

-

-

-

Theft car

77.5

12.5

2.5

-

-

-

7.5

Theft item car

65.0

27.5

-

-

-

-

7.5

Personal assault

75.0

25.0

-

-

-

-

-

Personal intimidation

37.5

52.5

5.0

-

-

5.0

-

Vandalism home

50.0

47.5

2.5

-

2.5

-

Graffiti home

70.0

30.0

Graffiti neighbourhood

30.0

50.0

10.0

Litter home

42.5

37.5

Litter neighbourhood

10.0

62.5

-

-

5.0

-

2.5

5.0

5.0

-

2.5

-

5.0

12.5

-

2.5

-

In both areas the majority of respondents said that they had reported the incidents of crime, vandalism, littering
etc to appropriate authorities. Less than one third did not report (Table 4.17).
7DEOH5HSRUWLQJ&ULPHVDQG,QFLGHQWV
.LOOLQDUGHQ

)HWWHUFDLUQ

n

%

n

%

Yes

27

58.7

26

65.0

No

15

32.6

12

30.0

Missing values / Non-response

4

8.7

2

5.0

Total

46

100

40

100



7DEOH7KH'HVWLQDWLRQRI5HSRUWVPDGHE\5HVSRQGHQWV
.LOOLQDUGHQ
n

)HWWHUFDLUQ
n

n

%

Gardai

6

10

Estate Management Group

10

5

Both Gardai and Estate Management

9

4

Other: Council, Housing Association,
Neighbour reported the incident

3

11

Total

28

30

Tables 4.19 and 4.20 outline the responses to the question ‘To what extent does each factor make you feel
safe or unsafe in you community?’. Taking the first response, it is clear that in both areas, respondents feel that
An Garda Síochána make them feel safe. However, the result for Fettercairn is stronger with 28.2% saying that
this makes them feel very safe. This compares with only 8.7% in Killinarden. Responses to ‘people living on
the estates’ generally attracted neutral responses however, as did responses for ‘young people living on the
estate’. The responses for Fettercairn are slightly higher on the ‘safe’ and ‘very safe’ end of the continuum.
When respondents are asked to differentiate between young people and adults, both give similarly neutral
answers. However the responses in relation to adults show a 40:60 divide between Killinarden and Fettercairn
respectively. This appears to point towards a higher degree of trust in other adults in Fettercairn.
Residents of both estates are emphatic: young people and adults who do not live in the estate appear to
produce greater feelings of un-safety among residents; and for both areas this appears to be stronger for
‘young people who do not live on my estate’. Having good relations with neighbours contributes to a strong
sense of safety for both pilot areas but again this appears to have brought a stronger response from Fettercairn
85% compared with 74%. Not surprisingly, anti-social behaviour in both areas produces feelings of un-safety.
Residents in both areas are also emphatic that drunken attacks, burglary, racially motivated anti social behaviour
and gang activity are factors that produce un-safety. However in this section of the data there is a high number
of missing values due to non-response.



7DEOH)DFWRUVWKDW5HVSRQGHQWłV,GHQWLI\DV0DNLQJ7KHP)HHO6DIH.LOOLQDUGHQ
9HU\
unsafe

A little
unsafe

Neither
VDIH
unsafe

A little
safer

9HU\VDIH

Missing

%

%

%

%

%

%

-

6.5

30.4

54.3

8.7

-

Other people who live in my
estate

4.3

23.9

45.7

26.1

-

-

Young people who live in my
estate

4.3

23.9

45.7

26.1

-

-

People (adults) who live in my
estate

4.3

10.9

41.3

37.0

4.3

2.2

Young people who do NOT
live in my estate

23.9

41.3

26.1

8.7

-

-

Older people (adults) who do
NOT live in my estate

13.0

39.1

39.1

6.5

2.2

-

The physical environment in
my estate

13.0

21.7

54.3

8.7

2.2

-

Knowing my neighbours

6.5

19.6

52.2

21.7

Anti-social behaviour
(e.g. noisy neighbours, forms
of harassment)

17.4

37.0

30.4

15.2

Drunken attacks or assaults

23.9

32.6

30.4

13.0

Burglary/crime

43.5

38.1

14.3

8.7

Racially motivated anti-social
behaviour

19.6

26.1

30.4

2.2

21.7

Gang activity

34.8

28.3

21.7

2.2

13.0

)DFWRUVWKDWPDNHPHIHHO

An Garda Síochána



7DEOH)DFWRUVWKDW5HVSRQGHQWłV,GHQWLI\DV0DNLQJWKHP)HHO6DIH)HWWHUFDLUQ
9HU\
unsafe

A little
unsafe

Neither
VDIH
unsafe

A little
safer

9HU\VDIH

Missing

%

%

%

%

%

%

An Garda Síochána

2.5

-

20

47.5

28.2

2.5

Other people who live in my
estate

5.0

25.0

35.0

27.5

5.0

2.5

Young people who live in my
estate

5.0

25.0

35.0

27.5

5.0

2.5

People (adults) who live in my
estate

2.5

5.0

32.5

52.5

7.5

-

Young people who do NOT
live in my estate

25.0

40.0

35.0

-

-

-

Older people (adults) who do
NOT live in my estate

17.5

30.0

40.0

5.0

-

7.5

The physical environment in
my estate

17.5

40.0

20.

20.0

-

-

-

-

15.0

52.5

32.5

-

Anti-social behaviour
(e.g. noisy neighbours, forms
of harassment)

17.5

37.1

37.1

5.0

-

12.5

Drunken attacks or assaults

27.5

20.0

25.0

7.5

-

20.0

Burglary/crime

57.5

21.9

6.3

-

-

20.0

Racially motivated anti-social
behaviour

30.0

20.0

20.0

5.0

-

25.0

Gang activity

42.5

15.0

22.5

5.0

-

-

)DFWRUVWKDWPDNHPHIHHO

Knowing my neighbours

Respondents were asked to give their view on the extent to which a list of agents were currently contributing
to creating a safer community. Responses from both communities reveal a nuanced picture. Respondents
considered that An Garda Síochána were making somewhat of a contribution but the trend in the Killinarden
site was towards the negative side of the spectrum (see Table 4.20 and Table 4.21 below).
In both areas it was felt that young people were not at all or contributing a little to safety: this is strongest in
Killinarden. In both areas it was felt that the SDCC was not at all or only contributing a little to safety which
is a surprising perception given the profile of the RCs in these estates. On balance, respondents seemed to
indicate they were themselves currently contributing in someway to a sense of safety in both areas. Looking at
the responses for ‘parents’ and ‘yourself’ it appears that the strong positively balanced answers in Fettercairn
seem to indicate a strong sense of self-efficacy or a positive belief that the area can contribute to its own
organisation.



7DEOH5HVSRQGHQWVł(YDOXDWLRQVRI$JHQWVRI6DIHW\.LOOLQDUGHQ
$JHQWV&UHDWLQJ$6DIH
&RPPXQLW\

Not at all

A little

6RPHZKDW

Quite a Bit

A Lot

Missing

%

%

%

%

%

%

Garda

21.7

37.0

23.9

8.7

8.7

Parents/ adults

17.4

7.0

24.4

17.4

2.2

2.2

Young people

56.5

23.9

11.1

4.4

2.2

2.2

Residents/ neighbours

8.7

30.4

13.0.

30.4

15.2

2.2

Yourself

4.3

32.6

19.6

30.4

10.9

2.2

The estate management

28.3

19.6

21.7

21.7

6.5

2.2

South Dublin Council

50.0

13.0

13.0

2.2

2.2

19.6

Everyone

10.9

37.0

23.9

15.2

6.5

6.5

7DEOH5HVSRQGHQWVł(YDOXDWLRQVRI$JHQWVRI6DIHW\)HWWHUFDLUQ
$JHQWV&UHDWLQJ$6DIH
&RPPXQLW\

Not at all

A little

6RPHZKDW

Quite a Bit

A Lot

Missing

%

%

%

%

%

%

Garda

12.5

30.0

27.5

15.0

15.0

Parents/ adults

7.5

32.5

25.0

30.0

5

Young people

45.0

22.5

15.0

15.0

2.5

Residents/ neighbours

12.5

35.0

12.5

25.0

15.0

Yourself

7.5

27.5

15.0

27.5

22.5

The estate management

10.0

7.5

32.5

15.0

South Dublin Council

27.5

30.0

5.0

22.5

7.5

7.5

Everyone

17.5

17.5

25.0

22.5

10.0

7.5

7.5

Respondents were asked to indicate their attitudes to aspects of living in their neighbourhood. In both
neighbourhoods half of those surveyed thought that it was a good place to live, slightly stronger for Fettercairn.
Most respondents said they could recognise most of the people living in the area and only half said that they
did not think their neighbours knew them. Approximately 78% in both neighbourhoods indicated they cared
what their neighbours thought of them. In terms of believing in their own self-efficacy, it might be argued that
Fettercairn residents have a strong resolve in their own capacity for problem solving. When asked if they were
intent upon living in the area for a long time, approximately 57% in both neighbourhoods thought this to be
true but Fettercairn residents appear to be stronger in this resolve in comparison to Killinarden residents (Tables
4.23 and 4.24 below).



7DEOH3HUFHSWLRQVRI/LYLQJLQWKH1HLJKERXUKRRG.LOOLQDUGHQ
&RPSOHWHO\
8QWUXH

0RVWO\
untrue

Neither
true or
untrue

0RVWO\
True

&RPSOHWHO\
True

%

%

%

%

%

I think my area is a good place for me to live.

8.7

17.4

23.9

43.5

6.5

People living in my area do not share the
same values.

2.2

26.1

26.1

34.8

10.9

I can recognise most of the people who live
in my area.

2.2

8.7

13.0

54.3

21.7

I feel at home in my area.

8.7

10.9

21.7

47.8

10.9

Very few of my neighbours know me.

17.4

23.9

10.9

41.3

6.5

I care about what my neighbours think of my
actions.

4.3

4.3

13.0

52.2

26.1

I have no influence over what this area is like.

4.3

17.4

28.3

32.6

17.4

If there is a problem in this area people who
live here can get it sorted.

2.2

28.3

45.7

19.6

4.3

It is very important to me to live in this
particular area.

23.9

26.1

17.4

13.0

19.6

People in this area generally do not get
along.

10.9

41.3

34.8

13.0

I expect to live in this area a long time.

17.4

10.9

15.2

34.8

21.7



7DEOH3HUFHSWLRQVRI/LYLQJLQWKH1HLJKERXUKRRG)HWWHUFDLUQ
&RPSOHWHO\
8QWUXH

0RVWO\
untrue

Neither
true or
untrue

0RVWO\
True

&RPSOHWHO\
True

%

%

%

%

%

I think my area is a good place
for me to live.

10.0

7.5

27.5

52.5

2.5

People living in my area do not
share the same values.

5.0

12.5

22.5

37.5

22.5

I can recognise most of the
people who live in my area.

2.5

2.05

12.5

50.0

30.0

I feel at home in my area.

10.0

12.5

20.0

45.0

12.5

Very few of my neighbours
know me.

20.0

22.5

5.0

50.0

2.5

I care about what my
neighbours think of my
actions.

7.5

2.5

10.3

50.0

27.5

I have no influence over what
this area is like.

12.5

5.0

17.5

45.0

17.5

If there is a problem in this
area people who live here can
get it sorted.

7.5

17.5

22.5

47.5

5.0

It is very important to me to
live in this particular area.

35.0

22.5

15.0

12.5

12.5

2.5

People in this area generally do
not get along.

12.5

32.5

28.9

20.0

2.5

5.0

I expect to live in this area a
long time.

17.5

10.0

15.0

22.5

35.0

Missing

2.5

 6XPPDU\RI6XUYH\5HVXOWV
ō The distribution of survey respondents by nationality, race and ethnic group underlines the
heterogeneous composition of both sites but particularly that of Fettercairn where 25% of the sample
was comprised of African householders.
ō The data for participation in and awareness of the Initiative indicates that the Initiative achieved a
relatively good level of dispersal throughout and penetration into the community, given the visible
nature of some of the activities and events.
ō Perceptions of changes in anti social behaviour and crime are perceived as unchanged for the most
part in the Killinarden site and focus group data indicates that, if anything, the problems became
worse. As in Chapter 3, interviews with stakeholders in this site reveal that what constitutes anti-social
behaviour for one agency or indeed for local residents, might not equate to a shared definition. The
term anti-social behaviour might well be considered a catch all category for a spectrum of nuisance
behaviours including dumping and littering.



ō Perceptions of change on these issues in Fettercairn however show a strong sense of improvement
especially in relation to anti social behaviour. This is in part generated by the work of the Initiative in
both changes to the physical environment and in working with young people.
ō Feeling unsafe, while acute for some, appears to be experienced intensely by a minority. Most
people feel safe in their homes and feel their children are safe but appear to be conscious of risks in
the neighbourhood. This might point to the need to think about engaging those who feel most
unsafe.





&KDSWHUɘ7KH,PSDFWRIWKH$VVLJQPHQWRI5$3,'
&RRUGLQDWRUV.H\,VVXHV

 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
This Chapter outlines and discusses the impact of the Initiative in the second phase, and it identifies key issues
for further discussion and reflection. The first phase of the Initiative was evaluated by the research team at
NUIG as summarised in Chapter Two of this report.
Community safety is a relatively new idea in the Irish context. It mobilises citizens and the state in the coproduction of safety and security in neighbourhoods. In this regard, community safety is potentially a radical
communitarian approach to crime control (Hughes, 2007) in that it severs the traditional model of policing
from police led crime prevention to a range of ‘nodal’ or networked approaches to social order (Shearing
and Wood, 2003; Wood and Shearing, 2007). In this regard experiments with community safety should not
be underestimated. Thus CDI has started a process with the SDCC who is already active as a player in the
community safety field. Both parties are involved in an innovative process to change mindsets and to broaden
action repertoires.

 ,PSDFWRIWKH$VVLJQPHQWRI5$3,'&RRUGLQDWRUVWRWKH&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\
Initiative
,PSDFWRQWKH$SSURDFKRIWKH5$3,'&RRUGLQDWRUV
The assignment gave the RAPID co-ordinators in the SDCC the scope to focus in on particular neighbourhoods
for very specific attention. The assignment also gave the RCs a support framework in the CET within which they
could identify precise community safety issues and work with CDI staff towards agreed actions. Working with
the Community Safety Initiative Manual, the RAPID co-ordinators assigned to the Initiative had access to a key
framework for the process and strategy adopted.
Communicating within the SDCC, the RAPID co-ordinators stimulated an interest within the Council amongst
key staff for the approach. Line managers of the RAPID staff were also impacted by the assignment in that
they identified specific areas in Tallaght West and other parts of the County where the same model could be
deployed to deal with similar challenges to those identified in the pilot areas. The SDCC appears to be clear in
its resolve to embrace this model within its brief as a key institutional player in the JPC structure.
A key dilemma for some RAPID staff was the extent to which the work they were assigned to under the
Initiative was different to the problem solving and community development work that they might have done
irrespective of the Initiative.
While all RAPID staff were involved in the process of planning, monitoring and implementing the Initiative, it
was championed by one RC in particular who took on to drive the Initiative with the support of colleagues.
Furthermore, the model was incorporated into the ongoing practice of this particular RC and was then
implemented as an approach in other areas on an informal basis.
The key impact of the mainstreaming of the Initiative in partnership with SDCC has been to demonstrate that
there is a role for local authorities in the implementation of community safety as a public good in addition to
the existing structures, activities and statutory responsibilities of local authorities as implied by the sections 3437 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005. Moreover, the Initiative demonstrates the practical steps that can be taken
to drive a positive safety programme at local level and that there is a practitioner role in delivering community
safety among local authority and Garda personnel.



,PSDFWRQWKH$SSURDFKRIWKH&',7HDP
Lessons learned from the previous stage of the Initiative from 2008-2011 were clearly taken on board by the
CDI staff. The team worked through existing structures as brokered by the RCs – the latter used their existing
networks and relationships at community level to deliver the Initiative in the pilot sites. The team acted in a
support, resourcing and consultancy role. An example of this was the use of RP training by the key actors
involved in the Initiative and its deployment to deal with specific issues in the Fettercairn site.
The team also brought forward the Community Safety Initiative Manual. The team have developed therefore a
solid expertise in the planning, design and implementation of a community safety model that is ready for wider
dissemination. The team has also developed a capacity to work with existing agencies and to serve as a hub
for the complex network of inter-agency relationships that need to be mobilised to implement the Initiative.

,PSDFWRQWKH&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\,QLWLDWLYH0RGHO
Two key goals of the Initiative at this stage were to mainstream it within existing agencies and to test out the
Manual. While it was impossible to mobilise all aspects of the model in this stage, it is clear that the model can
be deployed and implemented.
The implementation of the Initiative was hampered by the short timeframe. A clear consequence of this factor
was the relatively little time to develop the capacity of community actors and local residents within the pilot sites.
These points aside, the learning at this period demonstrates that agencies, once committed can collaborate to
achieve safety outcomes. The collaboration particularly at the Fettercairn site where community capacity and
agency collaboration was more highly developed, demonstrates the potential of the model to produce real
safety outcomes for residents.

,PSDFWRQ,QWHUDJHQF\5HODWLRQVKLSV
The Initiative managed to reignite an interest in community safety amongst the various stakeholders. The key
agencies became partners in the Initiative and agencies such as An Garda Síochána, the Youth Service and the
local authority along with key local resources, played some part at co-ordination or implementation level.
The Steering Committee developed an implementation and policy focused agenda and received updates on the
progress from the two sites. Energies might have waned as the Assignment of the RCs began to run its course.
That said the Initiative brought together a network of interested agencies that now provides a model for others
to follow.

,PSDFWRQ3HUFHSWLRQVRI&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\DPRQJ5HVLGHQWV
The results of the survey showed that perceptions of improvements in safety among households in the
Fettercairn site were greater than they were for the Killinarden site. Also it might be noted that there was a
greater collective capacity and a more acute awareness of the role of the RCs vis-à-vis safety in the former,
compared with the latter.
There was more specific emphasis on producing tangible community safety ‘quick wins’ in the Fettercairn site
and this, according to agencies there, was a critical factor in shaping the perceptions of improved safety. The
physical and environmental improvements which helped to improve the physical appearance of the site at
Killinarden could not have had the same impact upon perceptions of safety.



Local residents report that, by and large, they feel safe in their homes and the majority of households feel that
their children are safe. There remains a challenge to practitioners and service providers in both communities to
explore this issue further with an emphasis on fear reduction as well as promoting safety.

,PSDFWRQ5HODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQ5HVLGHQWVDQGWKRVH'HOLYHULQJ6HUYLFHV
The RCs used their existing contacts to make further inroads into communities that had felt abandoned. The
African community at Fettercairn through their community leaders and in their survey responses, report that
they have a better connection to community services. The RCs, along with other key actors in this community,
most notably the Community Estate Management and the Fettercairn Community Centre, created a supporting
and integrative network for these families and had tangible impacts on their quality of life. Residents in the
Fettercairn site perceived there to be a better sense of community and that there were more facilities available
for young people. A key lesson from this work is that it is bigger than safety and constitutes the front line of
social cohesion practice.
While there was a noted increase in the sense of community at the Killinarden site, relationships between
service providers and local residents have not greatly improved. Further community development work is
needed in this site over a sustained period to help residents there to develop a clearer sense of identity and
to improve their collective, civic engagement. This is not helped by the significantly weakened capacity of the
Killinarden Community Centre, which while providing very important services to the community of Killinarden
as well as a significant hub for the community, struggles to keep services going in light of budget cuts and
funding challenges. Interviews with key stakeholders revealed how difficult it has been to maintain community
engagement in the in-fill site despite the fact that there were very positive gains from the contributions of the
local residents who took part in the Initiative.

 0DLQVWUHDPLQJWKH&',&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\,QLWLDWLYH
Key to the approach of the RCs and the CDI Community Engagement Team was to avoid some of the pitfalls
identified in the earlier phase of the Initiative such as low community involvement and lack of buy-in for
imported modalities of safety, such as the community safety contract. An early decision was taken not to
pursue working with this measure that had hampered the Initiative in the early stages. The Restorative Practice
process developed by CDI has become a model of dispute / conflict resolution that in many respects, supersedes
the need for the contract in CS practice. It was important however to create this severance to enable the CET
and the RCs to activate themselves to a different approach.
The goal of CDI in this phase of the Initiative was to mainstream community safety. This has been successful
to a considerable extent. There are two critical aspects of the Initiative in this phase relating to mainstreaming
that should be underlined.
The first concerns the horizontal integration of the RCs in the Tallaght West communities that were served by
RAPID during its period of operation over a decade. The RCs were already integrated into community networks,
had established a high level of goodwill and had existing knowledge of the safety issues being experienced by
residents in the pilot sites. The Initiative was very quickly able to get practical ‘quick win’ actions mobilised to
very positive effect owing to this level of horizontal integration.



The second relates to the vertical integration of the RCs in the local government system. The RCs were fully
integrated members of the SDCC staff and participated in monthly staff conferences where they were able to
communicate with officials at all levels of seniority. This had the potential to place community safety at the
heart of good local government and to find a meaningful way in which the local authority and the citizen
could cooperate to make communities safer. As a model for the governance of security in Ireland there are
major lessons to be learned here for the social integration of isolated and marginalised communities. An added
dimension of this vertical integration is the potential flow of capital between the agencies with which the SDCC
is itself networked. Of immediate relevance here is the JPC through which the Council and An Garda Síochána
have a relationship but also the Council is networked with public transport providers and other development
agencies. The potential to mobilise a real impact should not be underestimated.
It follows that as a mainstreaming strategy by CDI this was a major success in that it managed to place
community safety within the system of local government. Notwithstanding that the SDCC is fully active in this
field anyway, the funding and co-working opportunities provided by the CDI enabled the RCs to engage in
focused work in the two pilot sites which they otherwise might not have had the time, and most importantly,
the autonomy to do.
It follows from this discussion that more time is required to enable community safety models to bed in, to pull
together the complexities of the model and to build community capacity.

 7KH&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\0RGHODQG&RPPXQLW\&DSDFLW\
At the centre of the CDI community safety approach is the Community Safety Manual (CSM). The Manual gives
effect to a logic model for the Initiative. As pointed out in Chapter Two, the spirit of the model is one that
emphasises community participation and community ownership for community safety.
Bringing together the RCs and the CDI staff to work jointly was a critical element of the Initiative and enabled
the speedy mobilisation outlined above. This was key to getting the Initiative active and on the ground in the
pilot sites; to provide an immediate ‘zoom in’, as one team member pointed out. Within this model of action
the opportunity exists to place community voices at the heart of the governance of safety and ultimately to
create a more meaningful form of government. In this phase of the Initiative while the RCs were mobilsed very
quickly to action the process outlined in the Manual, they were not sustained.
There are plenty of examples of the RAPID Co-ordinators making very tangible changes to the quality of life
of individual tenants using simple crime prevention and safety measures which can be as straightforward as
putting a piece of fencing on a wall. For the people in the housing estates these actions from the local authority
may cost little but they give a clear message that government is responsive and that government matters. There
is an issue, however about how sustainable it can be to provide these kinds of measures and whether they get
beyond the immediate fix where individual households are the clients, to a wider community safety.
There is a practical dilemma at the heart of any short run project: how much emphasis on delivering results;
and, how much development of local capacity? The emphasis on delivering to achieve quick safety outcomes
resulted in the partial implementation of the Initiative. It seems that there is a need to implement all of the
processes in the logic model in order to achieve the stated outcomes. CDI recognises that capacity building is
central to manualised, evidence based approaches to deliver high quality implementation, and that there is a
tension between manualised approaches and process led delivery of programmes.
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 :LGHQLQJWKH)UDPHRI$QDO\VLVDQG$FWLRQLQ&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\
The original research report (Axford et al, 2004) could not have grasped the complex changes about to unfold in
Irish society in general and Tallaght West in particular. This is evident in the way in which stakeholders depicted
the pilot sites. Two key issues stood out from these characterisations – the relative isolation of the Killinarden
site; and the particularly vulnerable position of African families in Fettercairn, leading ultimately to racism
towards them. In the case of Killinarden, residents spoke in a focus group of being “sandwiched” between the
older housing and new housing and not knowing whether they were one or the other. This created a sense of
abandonment and the need to fend for themselves. In Fettercairn the issues were about settling what could
be a very fractious and ultimately conflict-laden situation, whilst child safety concerns were the initial foci of
community safety. Thus the frame of action for community safety needs to be widened to one of achieving
social cohesion in a multicultural society.
The needs and issues in the Killinarden site had to do with helping the local community to develop community
ties. The assumption here is that without these ties they live in very isolated and highly individualised patterns
which does not contribute to the natural ‘soft’ surveillance that exists in established communities. Recognising
the broad complexity of needs in settling and building community in this neighbourhood, one key stakeholder
in this area pointed out that if needs were to be prioritised, the community did not need a community safety
initiative but a good GP service, better transport connections and access to a range of public and private
services that the rest of society takes for granted.
In Fettercairn the issues at stake were much more centred upon conflict resolution. In this latter context the
Initiative managed to make great inroads using the Restorative Practice model to great effect. The point already
made above is that there is a need to build community structures around these practices.
An ongoing challenge for community safety and for community development more broadly concerns the idea
of community itself. While both estates are regarded as ‘interface’ areas, the process of community building
is made more complex by the fact that unlike their host communities, they are more socially and culturally
heterogeneous. In this regard, residents may well have different expectations of what community means to
them and the challenge is how to build community cohesion around a common sense of identity. This is a
challenge to community safety and to community development given that identities are much more plural.

 %XLOGLQJRQ6XFFHVVDQG'HYHORSLQJ,QWHUDJHQF\5HODWLRQVKLSV
A key benefit of assigning the RCs to community safety is that it mobilised an existing network of service
providers who are already working together to deliver public goods in the pilot areas. A senior Garda spoke
highly of the good community of agencies that exists in Tallaght and the spirit of inclusion amongst these
actors is a major asset to the community safety process. The inter-agency relationships worked very well. In the
local Community Safety Steering Committee stakeholders reported that the Initiative gave a common sense of
purpose to these networks of relationships and a common language for understanding and addressing issues.
The youth intervention at Fettercairn was a major success in many respects and was seen generally as contributing
to what was regarded as a halting of anti-social behaviour in the newly built housing. Especially effective here
was the inclusive strategy deployed by key stakeholders to broker the Restorative Practice approach which
ultimately led to a win-win result for the young people and the community centre at Fettercairn. When looking
at perceptions of change in the community, focus group participants pointed out that the effects of the crime
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prevention measures at Fettercairn contributed to perceived drops in the level of anti-social behaviour. However
youth service staff pointed out that there were ongoing concerns about the displacement of young people
from the estate to a more secluded site which posed further risks to the young people themselves.
The Garda Youth Diversion Project (GYDP) at Fettercairn was involved in the youth subcommittee and participated
in identifying and including young people under the Initiative. However the Project was not convinced by the
categorisation of the young people targeted by the Initiative as ‘hard to reach’. It is clear that most of the young
people targeted by the Initiative already had some relationship and engagement with the youth service. While
the GYDP has to prioritise young people who are referred by the Juvenile Liaison Officer (JLO) under the Garda
Diversion Programme, the Initiative was also concerned with young people who were not necessarily dealt
with under this scheme and may not indeed have come to the attention of the Gardai as offenders. Even still,
records seen by the researcher reveal that most of the young people identified by the Initiative had current or
previous engagement with the youth service. If there is a lesson here it is that community safety has to ensure
that it works in an inclusive and co-ordinated way with existing providers, and with a commitment to an honest
sharing of information together and an ethos that facilitates that sharing.

 )LWWLQJ$FWLRQVWR&RQWH[WDQG6DIHW\2XWFRPHV
The community survey in both sites underlined that the Initiative achieved a good level of dispersal and
penetration in the pilot sites during the short period of implementation. Responses from the Killinarden site
appear to indicate that there has been little change in perceived safety, that there has been little change in antisocial behaviour and that problems that existed prior to the Initiative are still in place. This might say something
about the need to consider the fit between actions and context. So a question here is whether the Killinarden
site requires greater community development to create a common identity or does it need community safety?
Results for Fettercairn showed a clear sense of improvement especially in that the majority of residents agreed
that there was a reduction in anti-social behaviour. This appears to point towards the hypothesis that having
a range of integrated preventive measures, using a combination of environmental, situational and social crime
prevention measures achieves a greater sense of safety. Further piloting and evaluation of community safety
might examine this more closely.
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&KDSWHUə1H[W6WHSV

 /RFDO$FWLRQVLQ7DOODJKW:HVW
While the Initiative made great strides towards realising safety outcomes and mobilising local representation
and participation, the outcomes were strongest where existing community development infrastructure was
more developed. It follows that community safety appears to be best delivered in this context. Where this
infrastructure does not exist agencies should support its development as a priority to bring the community
towards the capacity for participation.
This phase of the Initiative was oriented towards mainstreaming – bringing together the key statutory agencies
with mandates in this area together with other key players. The principal recommendation arising from the
evaluation is that the mainstreaming process should be extended across South County Dublin in other areas to
be identified using the Community Safety Initiative Manual. Replication of the Initiative should be steered by a
lead agency to act as the co-ordinating body with the support of a range of agencies and the local communities
at the implementation level.

 &RPPXQLW\6DIHW\3ROLF\
$/HDG$JHQF\
Developments in the institutional framework for community safety have developed since the original piloting
of community safety in Tallaght West from 2009. Local authorities have been working with An Garda Síochána
to develop the role of JPCs. The focus for community safety practice to date has been concerned, in part, with
social order issues in public housing estates. A key lesson from this report is that the local authority, by virtue
of its co-ordinating capacity for local services and its pivotal position within the JPC structure, is the key agency
for community safety.

$6XSSRUW$JHQF\
It is clear from the report that CDI has developed a strong expertise in implementing community safety. Therefore
it has a specialist role in supporting agencies to replicate the community safety model in other settings. It has a
role to play in setting forward guidelines for implementation, training and advising the lead agency.

7LPHIUDPH
Community safety processes require appropriate timeframes to enable the setting in place of structures, local
training and capacity building, as well as the development and implementation of action plans. A minimum of
three years is required in any further piloting to develop sustainable safety outcomes with a post-implementation
phase of at least two years to maintain community capacity and to monitor community safety issues as they
arise. Housing estates need these structures and processes for this period as they move towards maturation.

 &RPPXQLW\6DIHW\3UDFWLFH
&RDOLWLRQVIRU6DIHW\DQG,QFOXVLYH3UDFWLFH
Community safety is a critical mechanism for thinking and acting cohesively between the state, civil society
actors and the citizen. The learning from this evaluation is that community safety requires a commitment to
building coalitions for safety that are inclusive, open and respectful. The experience with this Initiative has
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shown that the use of problem solving, a commitment to dialogue and the use of restorative practices, are
critical tools in the action repertoire of community safety.
The community safety practitioner is a highly skilled professional who has community development skills to
facilitate community participation, together with an understanding of crime prevention, human security and
social cohesion. The practitioner is also a person with mediation skills who can work within a restorative
framework. This enables practice that can deliver real local solutions while helping agencies to shape their
wider policies that produce security and safety effects.

&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\0XOWL&XOWXUDOLVPDQG6RFLDO&RKHVLRQ
Lessons learned from this process and evaluation underline the plural nature of community in social housing
settings. In-fill housing developments and multi-tenure housing developments have been grafted onto existing
communities: the residents in the latter ill-prepared perhaps to understand the change; those allocated social
housing may encounter challenges in settling; and this, may be complicated by racial abuse. This raises a range
of complex issues in relation to policy and practice in a variety of domains. Lessons from the implementation
of the Initiative demonstrate the role that the RCs played in working with these complex challenges. The role
of the practitioner in community safety is one of dealing with these multiple issues and working with people in
the communities to resolve them.

6.4 Evaluation
The lead agency will be the body responsible for commissioning and evaluation of any community safety
replication in consultation with the support agency. The evaluation will be a key means through which
mainstreaming can be further developed and ultimately towards replication on a wider scale.
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$SSHQGLFHV

$SSHQGL[&RQVHQW)RUPDQG,QWHUYLHZ6FKHGXOH 6WDNHKROGHUV
Consent Form DUBLIN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
5HVHDUFKHUłV1DPH'50$77%2:'(1
Faculty/School/Department: Faculty of Arts and Tourism, School of Social Sciences and Law.
Title of Study:
(YDOXDWLRQRI&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\,QLWLDWLYH &6, :HVW7DOODJKW
<(6
Have you been fully informed/read the information sheet about this study?
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study?
Have you received satisfactory answers to all your questions?
Have you received enough information about this study and any associated health and
safety implications if applicable?
Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from this study?
 ō DWDQ\WLPH
 ō ZLWKRXWJLYLQJDUHDVRQIRUZLWKGUDZLQJ
 ō ZLWKRXWDIIHFWLQJ\RXUIXWXUHUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH,QVWLWXWH
Do you agree to take part in this study the results of which are likely to be published?
Have you been informed that this consent form shall be kept in the confidence of the
researcher?

Signed:

Date:

Name in Block Letters
Signature of Researcher:
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Date:

NO

,QWHUYLHZ6FKHGXOH
Interviewee:
A. Context
1.

West Tallaght and the Pilot Estates for the Intiative – how would you describe them or characterise
them in your own understanding?

2.

Why was this initiative needed?

3.

What aspects of the context did the initiative seek to change or address?

4.

Was an alternative approach or strategy considered?

5.

Where there external factors that contributed to the formation of this Initiative? For example an
opportunity brought about because of a development in policy or the availability of funding?

%0HFKDQLVPV
6.
7.

What was your own role / the role of your organisation / agency? What role do you think you are able
to play or what contribution to you think you were able to make?
What are the key actions / measures that were used to change the conditions you described earlier
(i.e. re: questions 1 and 2) as you saw it?

8.

Where some of these actions easy to get off the ground compared with others? Which ones in your
view ‘worked well’ in getting started?

9.

Who decided on this range of actions? How was the decision made to use these actions? Did you think
that you were able to make a contribution to decisions about what actions were chosen?

10. Can you outline how you think your organisation / agency / [or you yourself] worked with people from
other organisations / agencies or interests in the Initiative.
&2XWFRPHV
11. Thinking back to the first reflection you were asked to make in question 1 – What changes do you think
have been made by this intitiative?
12. Did the initiative teach you anything? What would you do if you were starting again?
13. What other actions would need to be taken to achieve change in the context? Who should be on board
to make the change and what should they be asked to do?
14. Has the intitiative changed ways of working in any way? Can you list some key ways of working you
think have been effected by this intiative? What are they?



15. If the Government was to change the way in which communities are made safe tommorrow, what
would you advise them to do given what you have learned from this initiative.
16. Are there any other key issues you think the evaluation should note?

Thank you sincerely for your participation.
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$SSHQGL[6XUYH\4XHVWLRQQDLUH
&20081,7<6859(<
&20081,7,(62).,//,1$5'(1 )(77(5&$,51

)LHOGZRUNHU,QWURGXFWLRQ

Hello, my name is…..
I am a researcher with CDI, the Childhood Development Initiative. We are interested in your
views about community safety and the Community Safety Initiative which ran in your area from
June 2011-June 2012. CDI is an organization that supports and funds a range of programmes to
improve the lives of children and families in Tallaght West.
The Community Safety Initiative is one of CDI’s programmes. CDI worked with RAPID
Coordinators from South Dublin County Council to improve safety in this community. This
survey aims to capture the views of residents in the communities of Fettercairn and Killinarden
about the Community Safety Initiative. The survey is being carried out by CDI with support from
researchers at the Dublin Institute of Technology. The researchers will analyse the data and
report back to the CDI on their findings.

Would you be willing to answer some questions about this topic? It will take
approximately 20 minutes
If respondent indicates, yes, proceed.
If no*, thank them for their time.
* If no- establish if this is on grounds of it being an inconvenient time before leaving and
rearrange for more suitable time and date if appropriate.

,I\HV
Everything you tell me is confidential and if you do not want to answer any of the questions,
please just tell me this and I will move onto the next one. As I mentioned, the survey covers
questions about your views of community safety and the implementation of the Community
Safety Initiative. Have you any questions before I start?
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Firstly, I would like to give you an information sheet about this survey with some
contact details in case you have any further questions after we finish.
ō+DQGSDUWLFLSDQWDSHUVRQDOFRS\RIWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVKHHW
ō9HUEDOO\JXLGHWKHSDUWLFLSDQWWKURXJKWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVKHHW

)ROORZLQJFRPSOHWLRQRIWKLV

‘Are you still happy to take part in this survey?’
ō*XLGHSDUWLFLSDQWWKURXJKFRPSOHWLRQRIWKHVXUYH\
ō9HUEDOO\DVNHDFKTXHVWLRQDQGUHFRUGWKHUHVSRQVHVRQWKHVXUYH\

3$57$%2877+(3$57,&,3$17
To be completed by the fieldworker:


:KDWFRPPXQLW\LVWKHSDUWLFLSDQWIURP"

Killinarden

Fettercairn

Firstly, I am going to ask you some questions about yourself. The reason I am asking these
questions is that we want to be able to demonstrate that we have participants that represent
everyone who live in this area.


$UH\RX

Male

Female

Yes

No

[If this is clear, can be completed by the Fieldworker]


,VWKLV\RXUFXUUHQWSODFHRIUHVLGHQFH"

If no, thank the participant for their time and do not proceed.


:KDWDJHLVWKHSDUWLFLSDQW
Age

18 – 24 years

25- 44 years

45- 64 years

65- 74 years

75 years and over

7LFN

If participant is under the age of 18, thank them for their time and do not proceed.
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$UH\RX
The head of the household
Joint head of household
Adult child residing in the house
Other adult residing in the house

If so, get details



+RZ ORQJ KDYH \RX OLYHG LQ WKLV HVWDWH" LI OHVV WKDQ  \HDU QRWH WKH QXPEHU RI PRQWKV 
PRQWKVPRQWKVHWF 



$UH\RX
Single
Married
in Civil Partnership
Co-habiting
Separated/divorced
Widow/er
Other
'R\RXKDYHFKLOGUHQUHVLGHQWDWWKLVDGGUHVV"

Yes

No

Less
than 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 22 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 30+
1yr

No. of
FKLOGUHQ

Age





:KDWLV\RXUQDWLRQDOLW\"

 :RXOG\RXGHVFULEH\RXUVHOIDV
White Irish
White Irish Traveller
Any other White background
Black or Black Irish – African



Black or Black Irish – any other Black background
Asian or Asian Irish – Chinese
Asian or Asian Irish – Any other Asian Background
Other including mixed background
All ethnic or cultural backgrounds
Other (specify)
Would rather not say
,QUHODWLRQWR\RXUKRXVHDUH\RX PXOWLSOHDQVZHUVSRVVLEOHKHUH
Renting from the local authority / council
Renting from a housing association
Owner occupier
Shared owner scheme
Private tenant
Other
 'R\RXKDYHDQ\RIWKHIROORZLQJVHFXULW\VDIHW\GHYLFHVDYDLODEOHLQ\RXUKRXVH"
A monitored burglar alarm?
Another / non-monitored burglar alarm?
A medical emergency alarm / pendant alarm?
Other not listed; please specify

3$57,03/(0(17$7,212)7+(&20081,7<6$)(7<,1,7,$7,9(
 :HUH\RXDZDUHRIWKH&',&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\,QLWLDWLYH"

Yes

No

 ,Q\RXURZQZRUGVZKDWGLG\RXXQGHUVWDQGWKH&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\,QLWLDWLYHWREHDERXW"

 :HUH\RXDZDUHRIWKHUROHRIWKH5$3,'&RRUGLQDWRUVLQLPSOHPHQWLQJWKH&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\

,QLWLDWLYHLQ\RXUDUHD"
Prompt: These are Jerry Boyle, Sarah O’Gorman and Cathy Purdy
Yes
No
 'LG\RXHYHUPHHWDQ\RIWKH5$3,'&RRUGLQDWRUV"



Yes

No

 ,I\HVKRZPDQ\WLPHV"
 :KDWZDVWKHQDWXUHRIWKHLQWHUDFWLRQ"

 :HUH\RXRUDQ\RI\RXUIDPLO\LQYROYHGLQWKH&RPPXQLW\6DIHW\,QLWLDWLYH"
Interviewee

Yes

No

Other family members

Yes

No

 ,I\HVSOHDVHJLYHGHWDLOVRIZKRZDVLQYROYHGHJVLEOLQJVSRXVHHWF

 ,I\HVKRZGLG\RXEHFRPHLQYROYHG

 :KDWZDVWKHUROH V RI\RXDQGRUIDPLO\PHPEHU V "

 ,IQRZK\KDYH\RXQRWEHFRPHLQYROYHG"

 'LG\RXDWWHQGDQ\RIWKHIROORZLQJDFWLYLWLHV"


)RU.LOOLQDUGHQ5HVLGHQWV

Event

Date

/RFDWLRQ

$WWHQGHG"
3/($6(&,5&/(

,I\RXGLGQRWDWWHQG
ZHUH\RXDZDUHRIWKH
HYHQWRFFXUULQJ"
3/($6(&,5&/(

Residents Christmas Party

Killinarden
Community
15.12.2011
Centre
(KCC)

Yes

No

Aware

Not Aware

Coffee Morning

07.02.2012

KCC

Yes

No

Aware

Not Aware

Hanging Basket Workshop

28.03.2012

KCC

Yes

No

Aware

Not Aware

Clean-up and Planting Day

14.04.2012

On Site

Yes

No

Aware

Not Aware

N/A

Yes

No

Aware

Not Aware

Did you receive the following?
Community Flyer outlining
the events and services
available

13.02.2012





)RU)HWWHUFDLUQ5HVLGHQWV

Event

Date

,I\RXGLGQRWDWWHQG
ZHUH\RXDZDUHRIWKH
HYHQWRFFXUULQJ"
3/($6(&,5&/(

$WWHQGHG"
3/($6(&,5&/(

/RFDWLRQ

Residents Christmas Party

Fettercairn
13.12.2011 Community
Centre (FCC)

Coffee Morning

09.02.2012

Coffee Morning

16.02.2012

Yes

No

Aware

Not Aware

Fettercairn
Parade

Yes

No

Aware

Not Aware

K Close &
F Ave

Yes

No

Aware

Not Aware

N/A

Yes

No

Aware

Not Aware

Did you receive the following?
Community Flyer outlining
the events and services
available

15.02.2012

 ,Q\RXUYLHZZKDWHOVHFRXOGWKH&6,KDYHGRQHWRLPSURYHFRPPXQLW\VDIHW\LQ\RXUDUHD"

3$57&20081,7<6$)(7<
 :HDUHLQWHUHVWHGLQ\RXUYLHZVRIDQ\FKDQJHVLQ\RXUFRPPXQLW\RYHUWKHODVW\HDUV


7RZKDWH[WHQWZRXOG\RXDJUHHRUGLVDJUHHZLWKWKHIROORZLQJVWDWHPHQWV>)/$6+&$5'@
6WURQJO\
Disagree
disagree

Neither
DJUHH
disagree

Agree

6WURQJO\
agree

(i) The level of anti-social behavior in my community has
decreased.

1

2

3

4

5

(ii) The level of vandalism and graffiti in my community has
decreased.

1

2

3

4

5

(iii) The level of drug use in my community has decreased.

1

2

3

4

5

(iv) There has been an increased Garda presence in my
community in the 2 years.

1

2

3

4

5

(v) Young people take more pride in their community than
they used to.

1

2

3

4

5

(vi) My community feels safer than it used to me.

1

2

3

4

5

(vii) The physical environment in my community has been
improved (e.g. less dumping spots, more landscaping and
planting).

1

2

3

4

5



6WURQJO\
Disagree
disagree

Neither
DJUHH
disagree

Agree

6WURQJO\
agree

(viii) There is better security infrastructure in my area (e.g.
gates, fencing)

1

2

3

4

5

(ix) There is less vandalism in my community than there used
to be.

1

2

3

4

5

(x) There is less racism in my community than there used to
be.

1

2

3

4

5

(xi) There is less crime in my community than there used to
be.

1

2

3

4

5

(xii) There is less gang activity in my community than there
used to be.

1

2

3

4

5

(xiii)There is more of a sense of community than there used
to be (e.g. interaction with neighbours, feeling part of a
community).

1

2

3

4

5

(xiv) There are more activities for young people to do in my
area than there used to be.

1

2

3

4

5

We would like to ask you some questions about your sense of safety and whether you
have ever experienced certain types of crime or unwanted actions by others.
 >)/$6+&$5'@
Not at all
safe

A little
unsafe

Neither
safe nor
unsafe

6DIH

&RPSOHWHO\
safe

As a place to live, do you feel that your
community/ neighbourhood is

0

1

2

3

4

How safe do you feel in your home?

0

1

2

3

4

How safe do you feel your children are?
(only if relevant)

0

1

2

3

4
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Never

A few
2QFHD
times a
month or
\HDURUOHVV
less

A few
times per
month

2QFHD
ZHHN

A few
times a
ZHHN

(YHU\GD\

Burglary – where
someone entered
your home and stole
something

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Theft of property other
than at home

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Theft of my car

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Theft of an item from
my car

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Personal assault on self
or family member

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Personal Intimidation
on self or family
member

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Vandalism to my home

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Graffiti to my home

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Graffiti in the
neighbourhood near
my home

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Litter/ dumping at my
home or garden

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Litter / dumping in the
neighbourhood near
my home

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Other (obtain details):

 +DYH\RXH[SHULHQFHGRUEHHQDIIHFWHGE\DQ\RIWKHIROORZLQJLQWKHFRPPXQLW\LQWKHODVW

\HDUV">)/$6+&$5'@
 'LG\RXUHSRUWDQ\RIWKHLQFLGHQWVH[SHULHQFHV"

Yes

No

 ,I\HVWRZKRPGLG\RXUHSRUWWKHVHLQFLGHQWVH[SHULHQFHV" (multiple answers possible here )
Gardai
Estate management group
Other
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 ,I QR ZKLFK RI WKH IROORZLQJ UHDVRQV GR \RX WKLQN LQĠXHQFHG \RXU GHFLVLRQ QRW WR UHSRUW"

>)/$6+&$5'@
I believe the Gardai are too busy to do much about my problem
I believe the Gardai will do nothing about anything that I report to them
The estate management group were not appropriate to report it to
I believe the estate management group will do nothing about anything I report to them
I never heard of the estate management group
I feared if I reported it I would be a target for intimidation / further assault / vandalism / theft
etc.
I would rather not say
Other ________________________________________________________________________
 7R ZKDW H[WHQW GRHV HDFK RI WKH IROORZLQJ IDFWRUV PDNH \RX IHHO VDIH RU XQVDIH LQ \RXU

FRPPXQLW\">)/$6+&$5'@
7KH\
7KH\PDNH
PDNHPH
me feel
IHHOYHU\
a little
unsafe
unsafe

Neither
VDIH
unsafe

7KH\PDNH 7KH\PDNH
me feel a
me feel
little safer YHU\VDIH

(i)An Garda Síochána

1

2

3

4

5

(ii) Other people who live in my estate

1

2

3

4

5

(iii) Young people who live in my estate

1

2

3

4

5

(iv) Older people (adults) who live in my estate

1

2

3

4

5

(v) Young people who do NOT live in my estate

1

2

3

4

5

(vi) Older people (adults) who do NOT live in my
estate

1

2

3

4

5

(vii) The physical environment in my estate (e.g.
rubbish, graffiti, traffic, dumping, fencing and
lighting etc)

1

2

3

4

5

(viii) Knowing my neighbours

1

2

3

4

5

(xi) Anti-social behavior
(e.g. noisy neighbours, forms of harassment)

1

2

3

4

5

(x) Drunken attacks or assaults

1

2

3

4

5

(xi) Burglary/crime

1

2

3

4

5

(xii) Racially motivated anti social Behaviour

1

2

3

4

5

(xiii) Gang activity

1

2

3

4

5



 7RZKDWH[WHQWGR\RXWKLQNWKHIROORZLQJLQGLYLGXDOVRUJURXSVDUHLQYROYHGLQFUHDWLQJDVDIH

FRPPXQLW\DWWKHPRPHQW">)/$6+&$5'@
Not at all

$OLWWOHELW 6RPHZKDW 4XLWHDELW

A lot

(i) An Garda Síochána

0

1

2

3

4

(ii) Parents/Adults

0

1

2

3

4

(iii) Young people

0

1

2

3

4

(iv) Residents/Neighbours

0

1

2

3

4

(v) You

0

1

2

3

4

(vi) The Estate Management

0

1

2

3

4

(vii) South Dublin County Council

0

1

2

3

4

(viii) Everyone

0

1

2

3

4

For Killinarden: Killinarden Estate Management
For Fettercairn: Fettercairn Estate Management

 1RZZHZDQWWRDVN\RXVRPHTXHVWLRQVDERXWZKDW\RXWKLQNDERXW\RXUFRPPXQLW\



3OHDVHUDWHWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFK\RXFRQVLGHUWKHIROORZLQJVWDWHPHQWVWREHWUXHRUXQWUXH
>)/$6+&$5'@
&RPSOHWHO\
8QWUXH

0RVWO\
untrue

Neither
true or
untrue

0RVWO\
True

&RPSOHWHO\
True

(i) I think my area is a good place for me to
live.

1

2

3

4

5

(ii) People living in my area do not share the
same values.

1

2

3

4

5

(iii) My neighbours and I want the same thing
from my area.

1

2

3

4

5

(iv) I can recognize most of the people who live
in my area.

1

2

3

4

5

(v) I feel at home in my area.

1

2

3

4

5

(vi) Very few of my neighbours know me.

1

2

3

4

5

(vii) I care about what my neighbours think of
my actions.

1

2

3

4

5

(viii) I have no influence over what this area is
like.

1

2

3

4

5

(xi) If there is a problem in this area people
who live here can get it sorted.

1

2

3

4

5
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&RPSOHWHO\
8QWUXH

0RVWO\
untrue

Neither
true or
untrue

0RVWO\
True

&RPSOHWHO\
True

(x) It is very important to me to live in this
particular area.

1

2

3

4

5

(xi) People in this area generally do not get
along.

1

2

3

4

5

(xii) I expect to live in this area a long time.

1

2

3

4

5

 :RXOG\RXEHSUHSDUHGWRWDNHSDUWLQD)RFXV*URXSWRIXUWKHUGLVFXVVWKH&6,DQGWKHZRUN

RIWKH5$3,'&RRUGLQDWRUV"
Yes
No [take details separately]

Finally, thank you for taking the time to share your views on this topic with us. As a reminder, if
you would like to know more about the CDI or the Community Safety Initiative there are contact
details on the Information Sheet
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$SSHQGL[  9HUEDWLP 4XDOLWDWLYH 5HVSRQVHV WR Ł:KDW GR \RX
NQRZWKH&6,WREHDERXW"ł
Not aware.

Only aware through survey discussion. Aware other CDI
programmes

Sign post, flower planting and safety.

Anti social behaviour, children’s clubs.

To stop the anti social behaviour. To improve children's
lives.

Working with the children and the council to stop anti
social behaviour. Trying to make improvements.

To improve families lives and safety of this area. I heard
from my neighbours

Knocked on doors, called meetings about issues of anti
social behaviour

Helping with making the area look better and safe.

Aware but not familiar with the work.

Getting everyone together and making the area look nicer Aware of work in [area]. Know of the work but not
and safer.
definite details.
I think it is about solving a community problem.

Not aware of CSI

To maintain the upkeep of the outdoor areas.

To find out about environments, safety of residents and do
something to improve it.

To provide safety for residents.

Community safety

Not aware

To prevent anti- social behaviours and ensuring the safety
of residents

Safety and beauty of the place.

To stay safe in your home and community.

Safety of our community.

To carry out work in the community.

Making the area better

They look after the safety of the residents in an area.

Don't know anything about CSI

Not involved enough

I wouldn't be aware as I work during the day.

To maintain social network of the people living in the
community and general security of people living in the
area. To encourage participation in the community project.

Took part in clean up day noticed signs around for road
safety

I don't know what they do

See work done on road signs.

To encourage the residents to make their area safer to live
in. To give us something we need to make our area feel
safer.

Not aware

To make the area safer

They come to help improve the area. They put up fencing
to stop squatters in the area

Safety of this area.

They did clean up days painting planting, provide a skip
once a year, coffee mornings.

Don't know about it but may be my husband would know.

Not aware

Yes, safety of the children.

Signs put up. Not aware of other work done.

Good communication, safety for children.
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Put up road signs however they were vandalised by young To check some things in the community and to make sure
people.
people feel safe.
I haven't a clue about it.

Provide security and better living environments

Making the area safer for children.

I think it is about safety in the community

Placing signs for children. Could do more clean up work,
saw planting work.

Nothing really.

Trying to make here a better area.

There are Garda involved in CSI. Camera's are not
monitored. Meetings not regular enough.

I don't know anything about it.

Lots in place that does not work.

Haven't heard anything about CSI

In case of any trouble you can dial 999 or 112. Also some
work with community garda.



$SSHQGL[9HUEDWLP5HVSRQVHVWRWKH4XHVWLRQŁ,Q\RXUYLHZ
ZKDWHOVHFRXOGWKH&6,KDYHGRQHWRLPSURYHFRPPXQLW\VDIHW\
LQ\RXUDUHDł"
No personal problem with safety but other neighbours
have many.

Find it unsafe for kids. Children have nothing to dopossible playground. no one has access to gardens in
duplex housing. Nothing for 0- 5 years, teens or other
kids. Get community garda to come into the area like they
used to when I first moved in.

CCTV camera, some sort of playground could be done on
the wasteground on [site] Provide the bins/ litterbasket
along the walkway to stop public littering.

Didn't clean up what we asked- windows. we expect more
work to be completed for the money we pay to Circle. Fix
the fences that were broken- fences should be removed to
allow gardens to be used.

Speed ramps, more Garda patrol.

Remove drug users.

To get the kids involved in the clean up and some other
programmes.

Badly need ramps- brought to attention on numerous
occasion. Children still able to access ESB box, caused
serious issues over summer. Place CCTV cameras, lots of
burglary in area has not improved. Anti social behaviour
could be improved.

Nothing.

We need more green spaces for the kids to play on

Maybe some security cameras.

Happy enough with safety in the area.

CCTV or gates, security guards.

Not sure because Circle do a lot.

They have done a lot.

More Gardai

They could not do anymore, they did great work here.

Green area for kids to play on.

CCTV and more police patrols.

Could not do much else, did a lot. Playground- where is it?

Some form of surveillance e.g. CCTV. Gate to demarcate
each area.

Better structure on railings. People still enter estate and
cause hassle.

To put up a CCTV camera to catch the bad guys.

I think they have done what they could.

No problems, some things for the kids to do during the
summer.

More protection. There are people coming up from the
bottom end of [site] and causing trouble.

They are trying everything that has been suggested to
them but some kids wreck it.

They have done alot but can you stop people from other
areas coming to our area to cause trouble/ problems?

Ramps on the road, may be a community award.

Put cameras and more street lights on [site] Way. Alot of
cars park on the road meeting other people from different
areas which does'n't look right.

Not sure how to answer question. Have suffered some
racist attacks but not sure if anyone can help.

No.

I don't have a problem as I come home from work and
Would like the dorrs/ windows barred up like the
just keep to myself. Could place ramps in the area because
neighbours and a gate.
neighbours fly around the road in cars.



I don't have a problem as I come home from work and
Would like the dorrs/ windows barred up like the
just keep to myself. Could place ramps in the area because
neighbours and a gate.
neighbours fly around the road in cars.
Camera's in the area. When first moved in anti- social
behaviour was high. Would benefit with a gate to secure
Happy with living in this cul de sac, things seems to work.
wheelie bins. Front gate could be replaced- council
promised but it was never followed up.
Put some ramps in the area for the speeding cars. Unsafe
for the children. Further safety required at electricity box
around exit/ entry of the box.

I was happy when the fencing was put in as this reduced
vandalism to my home. The cameras are placed at the
other end of the street so it doesn't monitor our house.

Windows are too easy to get into. Requested ramps- cars
causing too much traffic, drive too fast.

More cameras that work- the picture is not good enough
to capture the cars burning or thieves. Quicker call out
time/ response from Gardai.

The windows can be easily opened. No pedestrian
crossing on the road, very unsafe for children.

Happy with the work. Very good.

Happy enough with the work as the cars getting broken
into, windows banged smashed and people throwing
eggs at windows stopped after the rapid coordinators
work.

They could get more involved in the anti social department
in the council, because the council seems not to listen to
the individual.

They couldn't have done anymore work- they helped out
a great de

To provide more activities for the young ones.

I am happy enough with the area.

Gate and railings

Have no problems on the estate now but did when I first
moved in around July 2009.

Centre camera in Fettercairn New Avenue.

The work was good. I was happy with the work
completed.

There is no magic about this situation, I don't know.

Always room for improvement. They did do lots of
stuff. the fencing was placed but not sufficient. Some
neighbours still get windows smashed. Cameras are not
To put CCTV camera on K. Close.
working properly and I was told no one is monitoring it so
it's pointless.
Not really aware of work completed.

Please do more gates.

Tackle the robbed cars. The ramps helped reduce a little
but it still happens.

Not sure because I don't know what they did.

They have done a lot

Things that have been done are good. Security camera,
Gardai etc are good things. I am not sure if anymore can
be done.

To visit this area frequently.

A lot of problems at the start, feels like not a lot can be
done. Boundary wall between school and houses needs to
be addressed.

I don't know, maybe if any other problems emerge but for
I don't know, everything seems normal.
now things are calm.
The camera to work at night time.

Provide efficient camera and more regular Garda Patrol.

To raise the back wall.

I don't know. It is difficult to change peoples mindsets.

I think they have done a lot.



The Childhood Development Initiative
St. Mark’s Youth and Family Centre
Cookstown Lane
Fettercairn
Tallaght, Dublin 24
Tel:
(01) 494 0030
Fax:
(01) 462 7329
E-mail: info@twcdi.ie
Web: www.twcdi.ie
Twitter: @twcdi

